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Citadel, Prokhorovka and Kharkov: The armoured losses of 
the II SS Panzer Korps Sonderverbände during the battle of 
Kursk, July-August 1943
Ben Wheatley
School of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
ABSTRACT
The three armoured SS Sonderverbände (special units) Leibstandarte, 
Das Reich and Totenkopf which constituted the II SS Panzer Korps 
played a key role during the battle of Kursk (5.7–23.8.1943), first during 
Operation Citadel (5–16.7.43) and then (minus the Leibstandarte) dur-
ing the defence of Kharkov (3–23.8.43). For the first time, as a result of 
a recent archival discovery (complete armoured inventories for 20.7.43 
and 1.8.43), this article can give the exact number of armoured losses 
the II SS Panzer Korps sustained during Operation Citadel, which 
included the supposedly crippling armoured battle of Prokhorovka 
(12.7.43). The article also establishes the actual number of operational 
AFV that was available to the II SS Panzer Korps before, during and after 
Operation Citadel. Taken together this information allows for a detailed 
examination of Hitler’s strategy preceding the defence of Kharkov, 
including his decision to send the II SS Panzer Korps to the Mius 
Front (30.7–2.8.43).
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Introduction
By the summer of 1943 the war on the Eastern Front had long since been lost by Germany. The 
Red Army’s vast superiority in men and material meant that victory was now impossible for 
Germany. The German Army had been worn down during the years 1941–1943 when the Red 
Army had been the only force capable of fighting the bulk of the Wehrmacht. However, in 
order to finally defeat the Wehrmacht vast battles still had to be fought. The battle of Kursk was 
the largest of these battles; indeed the 50 day battle (5.7.43–23.8.43) is regarded as the largest in 
military history. The battle consisted of the German offensive Operation Citadel (a pincer 
attack on the Kursk salient – this article focuses on the southern arm of this pincer), and the 
two Soviet counter-offensives (aimed at Orel and Kharkov). During the fighting the two sides 
deployed more than 4 million troops, 69,000 cannon and launchers, 13,000 tanks and self- 
propelled guns, and almost 12,000 aircraft. The bitterness of the fighting is shown by the fact 
that the Red Army lost a total of at least 6,064 tanks.1 It is clear that the Soviet Union 
CONTACT Ben Wheatley Ben.wheatley@uea.ac.uk School of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
1Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2017), 83–4. The 
breakdown of total write-offs of Soviet tanks and assault guns was 1,614 during the defensive phase (Operation 
Citadel), 2,586 during the Orel counter-offensive, and 1,864 during the Belgorod-Kharkov counter-offensive.
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contributed the most towards the overall Allied victory during the Second World War. Yes, 
economic factors and the Western Allies air and sea power need to be taken into considera-
tion, but by the time the Western Allies finally landed in Normandy in the summer of 1944 the 
Wehrmacht was a shadow of its former self. The reason for this was chiefly down to the 
massive loss of material and years of bloodletting the Wehrmacht had suffered on the Eastern 
Front.2 There is no doubt that the Red Army, despite suffering very high losses in men and 
material, won a convincing victory at Kursk.3 However, in a battle of the size and scope of the 
battle of Kursk some setbacks for the Red Army were inevitable. The overall Soviet victory at 
Kursk is not in any way diminished by highlighting examples where the Germans inflicted 
serious losses on the Red Army (Figure 1).
For the first time as a result of a recent archival discovery this article is able to reveal 
the true number of armoured fighting vehicles (AFV – tanks, assault guns and tank 
destroyers) losses the II SS Panzer Korps sustained during Operation Citadel 
(5–16.7.1943).4 As only units from the II SS Panzer Korps fought in the armoured battle 
of Prokhorovka on 12.7.43 this discovery will also impact the historiography of that 
battle. The article will confirm that in July 1943, instead of being crushed, the II SS Panzer 
Korps emerged relatively unscathed from Operation Citadel and, were it not for Hitler’s 
operational and strategic incompetence, would have played a decisive part (at least 
initially) in the defence of Kharkov the following month.
The originality of the methodology used in the formation of this, and the author’s 
previous article could be described as ‘deep research’ (embedding oneself in the finite 
statistical data located in a large array of archival documents which are spread over 
a broad chronological range). The meticulous and exhaustive study of vast amounts of 
detailed statistical information from company to Army Group level over an extended 
period of time enables a hitherto unknown level of understanding to be obtained of the 
operational and strategic levels of war. For example, this form of research enabled the 
author to determine the true strength of the II SS Panzer Korps immediately following 
the conclusion of Operation Citadel and the battle of Prokhorovka, both in terms of the II 
SS Panzer Korps armoured inventory and operational readiness. Only after this informa-
tion was gained did the true folly of Hitler’s decision making following the battle of 
2Wegner, Bernd, “The War against the Soviet Union 1942–1943” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, 
Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VI – The Global War (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2015), 863–71. See 
also Kroener, Bernhard R, “Management of Human Resources, Deployment of the Population, and Manning the Armed 
Forces in the Second Half of the War (1942–1944)” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume V/II – Organization and Mobilization in the German Sphere of Power: Wartime 
Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1942–1944/5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2015), 1012–23.
3Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 200 & 200 n. According to Russian 
sources during the battle of Kursk the Soviets lost 863,303 men, of whom 254,470 dead or missing. Of these personnel 
losses, 177,847 were incurred in the defensive phase, 429, 890 during the Orel counter-offensive, and 255,566 during 
the Belgorod-Kharkov counter-offensive. Boris V Sokolov points out a number of contradictions in the official Soviet 
account and estimates the losses at 1,677,000 men. See Sokolov, Boris V “The Battle for Kursk, Orel and Charkov: 
Strategic Intentions and Results. A Critical View of Soviet Historiography”, in Gezeitenwechsel, 69–88. German losses 
over this period (5.7–23.8.43) were approximately 170,000, of whom 46,500 dead or missing. 54,182 (11,023 dead or 
missing) during Operation Citadel; Orel offensive 86,064 (25,515 dead or missing); Belgorod-Kharkov offensive just 
under 30,000 (10,000 dead or missing).
4All archival documents in this article are located at the US National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, 
MD unless otherwise stated. AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage 
Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441.
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Prokhorovka become visible. Other military historians may well find utility in this type of 
methodology. Although time-consuming the results surely warrant such a dedicated 
approach.
The battle of Prokhorovka lends itself to this form of research as the results enable the 
reader to cut through the battle’s extensive mythology and faulty scholarship. Soviet and 
Western historiography for many years claimed that between 76.6% (400 AFV) and 57.5% 
(300 AFV) of the II SS Panzer Korps AFV was destroyed during the battle. Indeed, as 
recently as 2020 there were reports in Russia that claimed the II SS Panzer Korps lost 75% 
Figure 1. The battle of the Kursk Salient (5 July to 23 August 1943), source: map II.IV.7., Frieser, Karl- 
Heinz Germany and the second world war volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon 
press 2017). Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
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of its AFV at Prokhorovka.5 However, as a result of the author’s archival discovery of the II 
SS Panzer Korps’ first post-Operation Citadel armoured inventory (20.7.43 – all trace of 
this inventory was thought to be lost), this article can reveal that in reality a maximum of 
3.1% (16 AFV – including 2 AFV requiring homeland maintenance) of the II SS Panzer 
Korps AFV were destroyed between 11–20.7.43, as stated this included the battle of 
Prokhorovka (12.7.43). Remarkably, the author can also state for the first time that the II 
SS Panzer Korps lost just 7.5% (41 AFV) of its pre-Operation Citadel AFV inventory 
during the entire operation. In addition, it is clear that the battle of Prokhorovka had no 
long-term impact on German AFV operational readiness. In the early hours of 11.7.43 
(the day prior to the battle) the II SS Panzer Korps possessed 339 operational AFV while on 
the evening of 18.7.43 the Korps could call on 350 operational AFV. Therefore, the Korps 
operational strength actually increased over this short period by 11 AFV (a maximum of 4 
new AFV were received by the II SS Panzer Korps between 5–18.7.43).6
However, when reading this article it should not be forgotten that the SS Panzergrenadier 
Divisions Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH), Das Reich (DR) and Totenkopf (SS-T) which 
constituted the II SS Panzer Korps at the start of July 1943 were part of a paramilitary 
organisation that fought for, and was an integral part of, an evil and abhorrent nationalist 
regime that was based on an racist ideology of intolerance, hatred and aggressive expansionism.
The three divisions of II SS Panzer Korps and the German Army’s Grossdeutschland 
division were all (due to their expanded table of organisation and strength) considered 
Sonderverbände (special units). As a result they played a central role in the German 
operations during the battle of Kursk in July and August 1943.7 In July 1943 the divisions 
of II SS Panzer Korps were arguably at their peak in terms of troop quality, tactical 
knowledge, technological advancement of weaponry and AFV operational readiness vis- 
a-vis the Red Army.8 Although late August 1943 saw the introduction of the advanced 
Panther tank into the Waffen SS, by contrast troop quality had started to ebb and as 
a consequence tactical superiority had begun to be diluted, AFV operational levels began to 
plummet and supply issues developed. In the summer of 1943 the Red Army, despite 
massive superiority in tank numbers, was still reliant on the T-34 tank with its 76 mm main 
gun which had become inferior in firepower to the latest German Pz IV with its 75 mm long 
barrelled weapon. Significantly the Pz IV was present with the II SS Panzer Korps in large 
numbers (168–8 of which were infantry support tanks) at the start of July. The Pz VI Tiger 
tank although only available in small numbers (42) was imperious on the battlefield. The by 
now outdated Pz III with the 50 mm long barrelled main gun was still present with the 
korps (138 – primarily with DR and SS-T) but it could still prove a threat to Red Army 
5Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 120–21, 128–34; See post from the 
Official Twitter account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on 12.7.2020: ‘On 12 July 1943 the largest tank battle 
in history commenced at Prokhorovka, part of the enormous Battle of Kursk. The Red Army withstood Nazi onslaught, 
pushed them back, destroying 75% of their tanks. That same day Soviets launched counter offensive to crush the 
enemy’ https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1282197556626432000 accessed on 12.7.2020.
6See Table 25, Table 26, Table 27 and Table 28. The lack of an II SS Panzer Korps AFV inventory for 20.7.43 is alluded to in 
the transcript of a 2018 interview with the noted Kursk historian Valeriy Zamulin. This transcript can be found on the 
excellent Tank Archives blog: http://www.tankarchives.ca/2018/11/zamulin-on-losses.html accessed on 15.12.2018.
7Friedli, Lukas, Repairing the Panzers: German Tank Maintenance in World War 2 Vol 1. (Monroe: Panzerwrecks Publishing 
2010), 162.
8Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 157–68.
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tanks if operated by an experienced crew.9 Superior German tactics (often flexible), 
command & control (all German tanks possessed two-way radios, whereas only Red 
Army company command tanks was so equipped), three man turrets (as opposed to the 
Soviet two), high calibre optics and accurate weapons all added to the difficult task faced by 
Soviet tankers in the summer of 1943.10 These factors undoubtedly contributed to the 
disproportionally low AFV losses suffered by the three SS divisions compared to the Red 
Army armoured units that they faced in July and August 1943. Ironically it also seems that 
from late August 1943 the Germans’ inability to return large amounts of their damaged 
tanks to action also contributed to a reduction of German AFV total losses (Totalausfälle – 
TF) – the AFV were simply not on the battlefield to be shot at!11
The author’s previous two articles on the subject focused primarily on the battle of 
Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943, and the limited negative impact the battle had on the II SS 
Panzer Korps divisional AFV inventories or even on short-tem operational readiness (see 
Operation Roland preparations below and 18.7.43 AFV operational numbers in Table 6). The 
first article ‘A Visual Examination of the battle of Prokhorovka’ gave a detailed visual descrip-
tion of the battle by presenting both original and freshly analysed Luftwaffe reconnaissance 
images of the battlefield taken in July and August 1943 (including highlighting for the first 
time such fundamentals as the location of the notorious anti-tank ditch in the images); in 
other words the article explored the immediate impact of the battle.12 The second article 
‘Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured longevity on the Eastern Front 1943–1944ʹ high-
lighted the fact that the vast majority of the German armour present with the main partici-
pants the LSSAH and DR, had survived the battle and indeed many of these AFV were still in 
existence well into the winter of 1943/44.13 The article therefore explored the long-term 
impact of the battle of Prokhorovka. In regards to DR this was largely achieved by matching 
the chassis numbers of its AFV (including 52 ex-LSSAH panzers received on 28.7.43–51 were 
present at Prokhorovka) before and after the battle (from October 1943) in the monthly 
divisional inventories. After Operation Citadel the LSSAH did not see action again until 
November 1943. As a result it was relatively straightforward to establish in the post-Operation 
Citadel records which of the LSSAH’s AFV were of Prokhorovka vintage. In addition, even 
though SS-T did not, to any great extent, participate in the battle of Prokhorovka, the 
division’s post-Operation Citadel AFV losses were also chronicled primarily as on 28.7.43 
SS-T received 42 ex-LSSAH panzers (38 of which were present at Prokhorovka).14
The author’s second article also addressed a number of outstanding issues relating to the 
number of total losses the LSSAH had supposedly suffered during the battle of Prokhorovka. 
For example, it was evidenced that it was extremely likely that 3 rather than 4 LSSAH Pz IV 
were total write-offs (another LSSAH Pz IV was recovered and categorised −3.a- for homeland 
9PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS- 
T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390.
10Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 157–68.
11Compare declining operational AFV numbers in Tables 20–24 and Figure 15.
12NARA Series RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. See specifically photographs relating to the 
battlefield of Prokhorovka: for 14 July see; GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24 and GX-2696-SK-52. For 16 July see; GX-3734- 
SK-61 (incorrectly dated as 15 July by NARA). For 7 August see; GX-3942-SK-69. Ben Wheatley, “A Visual Examination of 
the Battle of Prokhorovka,” Journal of Intelligence History, Vol.18, No.2 (2019), 115–63.
13Ben Wheatley, “Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured longevity on the Eastern Front 1943–1944,” Journal of 
Intelligence History, published online 2020, 1–87.
14II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80.
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maintenance).15 It was also shown that a LSSAH Tiger that was said to have been immobilised 
during the battle still possessed the clear potential (given its continued proximity to SS-T 
troops) to have been eventually classified as a total loss.16 This article will provide further 
supporting evidence in regards to the potential fate of this LSSAH Tiger. It will also establish 
for the first time the total number of ex-Soviet T-34 that were lost by DR during Operation 
Citadel – including the potential for a loss occurring during the battle of Prokhorovka. It will 
conclude with a reflection on the accuracy of the battle of Prokhorovka AFV total loss sources, 
and offer a cautionary note against any claims of a definitive loss total for the battle. This article 
should be viewed as forming the final part of a trilogy, alongside the author’s two recent 
articles on the subject.
The 6th Army’s Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 
1.8.43
There has hitherto been a lack of confirmatory evidence regarding the number of total losses 
(3a & 3.b types) that the II SS Panzer Korps suffered during Operation Citadel, even though 
one could point to a few total loss reports from July 1943.17 One of these total loss reports 
came from a seemingly very creditable and reliable source namely the II SS Panzer Korps 
engineer. The report covered losses the korps suffered between 5–18.7.43.18 The report 
recorded losses as either total losses (category 3.b) or those requiring Homeland 
Maintenance in Germany (category 3.a but also potentially unofficially in category 2.c – i.e. 
allowed to remain in an divisional inventory). As far as the author is aware this document first 
appeared in the historiography of the battle of Kursk in 2007.19 As only an engineer had the 
authority to write off a tank as a total loss the importance of this document is clear (Figure 2).
However, without any (seemingly) surviving SS Sonderverbände ten-day status reports 
or end of month chassis number inventories for the period of 11–20.7.43 or 21.7–1.8.43 
which covered the latter period of Operation Citadel (11–16.7.43, including the battle of 
Prokhorovka on 12.7.43), the subsequent defensive operations (17–20.7.43, the II SS Panzer 
Korps HQ, LSSAH & DR withdrew from the front on 17.7.43 while SS-T left the front on 
15PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, 
DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 
10.7.43, T313, R390; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 
28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31. Ben Wheatley, “Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured longevity on the Eastern 
Front 1943–1944,” Journal of Intelligence History, published online 2020, 19–24.
16Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, p.127 & p.127 n.; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, 
XXXXVIII.Pz-AK daily report, Totenkopf reports Soviet attacks throughout the day in the area in question. 18.7.43, T314, 
R1171, F000388; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII Korps HQ planned orders for Totenkopf to begin to evacuate the area on the 
night of 18–19.7,43. 18.7.43, T314, R1171, F000394; II SS Panzer Korps, War diary entries for 17–19.7.43, T354, R605, 
F000100-10; II SS Panzer Korps, Map of korps actions, new and proposed front lines 14–18.7.43, T354, R606, F000035; III 
Pz-AK, Map of korps frontline 17.7.43, T314, R198, F000323; III Pz-AK, Map of Attila line etc. 17–19.7.43, T314, R198, 
F000325; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 
12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. 
Bestandsmeldung. 10.7.43, T313, R390; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated 
to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; Ben Wheatley, “Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured 
longevity on the Eastern Front 1943–1944,” Journal of Intelligence History, published online 2020, 24–32.
17Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RH 10/64, General Inspector of Panzer Troops – AGS, 5–17.7.43 Totalverluste; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Correspondence from II SS Panzer Korps 1a to Hitler’s SS adjutant Fritz Darges at FHQ, Status of II SS Panzer Korps 
at midday 21.7.43 (sent 23.7.43), T354, R605, F000853; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 
5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31.
18II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31.
19See Alexander Tomzov’s chapter in Tankovy udar. Sovetskie tanki v boyakh. 1942–1943 (Moscow: Eksmo 2007).
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the evening of 20.7.43) and the period prior to the II SS Panzer Korps returning to combat 
on 30.7.43 (21–30.7.43) then we had no way of confirming whether the II SS Panzer Korps 
engineer’s loss report was truly accurate, particularly in regards to SS-T losses.20 The 
engineer’s report did look to have the potential to be definitive but without the necessary 
confirmatory evidence from the latter half of July this could not be declared the case.
Importantly, it has now proved possible to locate the 6th Army’s Wochenmeldung über 
Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand for 1.8.43 (Figure 3) which covered the period 21.-
7–1.8.43. This document gives the number of operational, short-term damaged (under 
14 days) and long-term damaged (over 14 days) AFV (per type) that were in the inventories 
of the armoured units of 6th Army on the Mius Front on 1.8.1943.21 Crucially, the 
document includes the SS Panzergrenadier Divisions Das Reich and Totenkopf, which in 
the previous few days had been transferred to 6th Army’s control.22 The Wochenmeldung 
tells us that Das Reich had 172 panzers in its inventory on 1.8.44, while SS-T had 159 
panzers on the same date.23 If we include the assault guns and tank destroyers that DR and 
SS-T were known to have had on 1.8.43 the numbers for AFV are; DR 216 AFV and SS-T 
202.24
Remarkably, the Wochenmeldung also offers us the first opportunity to view the 
respective AFV inventories for DR and SS-T in the previous ten-day status report 
of 20.7.43; these reports covered the period 11–20.7.43. We can see that on 20.7.43 
Das Reich had 130 panzers in its inventory, while SS-T had 132 panzers on its 
books.25 Again if we include assault guns and tank destroyers we can see DR had 
174 AFV while SS-T had between 175–177 AFV.26 The 20.7.43 AFV status report 
20II SS Panzer Korps, Map of korps actions, new and proposed front lines 14–18.7.43, T354, R606, F000035; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer Korps, 18–22.7.43, T354, R606, F000038; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Gliederung des II SS Panzer Korps am 22 und 23.7.43 bis zur Bereitstellung und Lage bei XXXX.A.K., T354, 
R606, F000039; II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellungs u. Angriffsplan für den Angriff am 24.7.43, T354, R606, 
F000040; II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer Korps, 24–29.7.43, T354, R606, 
F000043; II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellung des II SS Panzer Korps am 29.7.3 und Verlauf des 30.7.43, T354, 
R606, F000050-51.
21AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441.
22II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer Korps, 24–29.7.43, T354, R606, F000043.
23AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 
6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441. For an unknown reason DR sole Pz II was not included in Wochenmeldung even 
though there was a column for this type – the Pz II was not lost until the autumn of 1943 – see appendix of 
author’s last article Surviving Prokhorovka . DR also had a Bef Pz I, however, Pz I were not recorded by the 
Wochenmeldung. SS-T had neither Pz I nor Pz II. The LSSAH also had begun Operation Citadel with 3 Pz I, of 
which 1 was Bef, and 4 Pz II. The only light panzer lost by the II SS Panzer Korps during Operation Citadel was 
a LSSAH Pz I Bef which was lost between 5–10.7.43, PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. 
und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, written 12.7.43, T313, R390; For consistency the author has not recorded light tanks in 
the tables contained in this article.
24AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; II SS Panzer 
Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; In addition for the launch of Operation Citadel each of the 
three divisions of the II SS Panzer Korps possessed 12 Wespe self-propelled light field howitzers and 6 Hummel self- 
propelled heavy field howitzers. No losses to these weapons were reported during Operation Citadel. See appendix in 
author’s last article Surviving Prokhorovka.
25AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441.
26AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 
6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, 
R201; II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390.
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is of fundamental importance to our understanding of the II SS Panzer Korps 
losses during Operation Citadel and of course the battle of Prokhorovka, which 
was fought on 12.7.43 solely by units of II SS Panzer Korps (principally LSSAH 
and DR). By comparing the SS divisional inventories at the launch of Operation 
Citadel on 4.7.43 (the offensive began the following day) with those of 10.7.43, 
Figure 2. II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 
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20.7.43 and 1.8.43 we are finally able to obtain the true number of AFV losses the 
II SS Panzer Korps suffered during Operation Citadel.27 The main importance of 
the 1.8.43 status report is that it allows us to accurately decipher the makeup of 
20.7.43 status report per tank type. Therefore, this new article explores the short– 
term impact of Operation Citadel and the battle of Prokhorovka on the divisions 
of the II SS Panzer Korps (See Table 1 to 8).
Table 1. II SS Panzer Korps – Pre-Operation Citadel AFV inventory (5.7.43).28
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Inventory 4.7.43 13 83 - 13 9 118 35 21 174
DR Inventory 4.7.43 62 33 24 14 9 142 34 12 188
SS-T Inventory 4.7.43 63 52 - 15 9 139 35 11 185
Total 138 168 24 42 27 399 104 44 547
Table 2. II SS Panzer Korps – pre-operation Citadel operational AFV (5.7.43).29
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Operational DR 4.7.43 11 79 - 12 9 111 34 20 165
DR Operational 4.7.43 47 30 18 12 8 115 33 11 159
SS-T Operational 4.7.43 59 47 - 11 8 125 28 11 164
Total 117 156 18 35 25 351 95 42 488
Table 3. II SS Panzer Korps – pre-battle of Prokhorovka AFV inventory (12.7.43).30
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Inventory (01:00 11.7.43) 12 78 - 12–13* 9 111–112 33 19 163–164
DR Inventory (01:00 11.7.43) 60 31 22 13 9 135 34 12 181
SS-T Inventory (01:00 11.7.43) 61 48 - 14 9 132 34 11 177
Total 133 157 22 39–40 27 378–379 101 42 521–522
Table 4. II SS Panzer Korps – pre-battle of Prokhorovka operational AFV (12.7.43).31
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Operational 01:00 11.7.43 5 41 - 4 6 56 23 17 96
DR Operational 01:00 11.7.43 40 16 8 1 5 70 29 11 110
SS-T Operational 01:00 11.7.43 53 30 - 11 7 101 21 11 133
Total 98 87 8 16 18 227 73 39 339
27PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an 
Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; 
II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; Full delivery reports for all 
panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website.
28PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self- 
propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website.
29Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 187–88.
30PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an 
Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; Full 
delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. 
*This depends on which LSSAH Tiger was actually written off.
31Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 187–88.
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It is unlikely that any record dealing with large numbers of AFV is going to be 100% 
accurate as the odd AFV may well have been reclassified at some point. But there is little doubt 
Table 5. II SS Panzer Korps AFV inventory following operation Citadel & its aftermath (21.7.43).32
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Inventory 01:00 21.7.43 (following Citadel) 12 74 - 12 9 107 32 22 161
DR Inventory 01:00 21.7.43 (following Citadel) 60 27 21 13 9 130 32 12 174
SS-T Inventory at 01:00 21.7.43 (following Citadel) 61 48 - 14 9 132 34 9–11* 175–177
Total 133 149 21 39 27 369 98 43–45 510–512
Table 6. II SS Panzer Korps operational AFV following operation Citadel & its aftermath (evening 
18.7.43).33
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Operational 19:25 18.7.43 7 55 - 9 8 79 28 16 123
DR Operational 19:25 18.7.43 36 24 17 9 7 93 28 10 131
SS-T Operational 19:25 18.7.43 30 29 - 7 7 73 20 3 96
Total 73 108 17 25 22 245 76 29 350
Table 7. SS Sonderverbände AFV inventory following the capture of Hill 213.9 (1.8.43).34
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
DR Inventory 01:00 2.8.43 58* 60 21 22 11* 172 32 12 216
SS-T Inventory 01:00 2.8.43 61 67 - 22 9 159 34 9 202
Total 119 127 21 44 20 331 66 21 418
Table 8. SS Sonderverbände operational AFV following the capture of Hill 213.9 (1.8.43).35
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
DR Operational 01:00 2.8.43 23 15 6 1 8 53 16 10 79
SS-T Operational 01:00 2.8.43 40 9 - 1 6 56 18 6 80
Total 63 24 6 2 14 109 34 16 159
32PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an 
Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; 
II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH 
Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, 
R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, 
R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, 
assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. *2 SS-T Pak SF lost sometime 
between 11.7.43 and end of Mius operation.
33Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 187–88; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII.Pz-AK daily 
reports for SS-T 18–20.7.43 T314, R1171, F000388-482.
34AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps,; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, 
R201; II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; Full delivery reports 
for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. *2 Pz III lg listed 
under Bef.
35AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982.
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the 6th Army Wochenmeldung brings us as close as is realistically possible to obtaining 
a definitive account of the II SS Panzer Korps AFV losses during Operation Citadel, and 
with it the maximum number of German AFV losses that could have occurred during the 
battle of Prokhorovka.
On the day of the Wochenmeldung (1.8.1943) DR and SS-T were in the midst of a counter- 
offensive, launched on 30.7.1943, which aimed to crush the Soviet Mius bridgehead which in 
turn was centred on Dmitrijewka.36 The bridgehead had been created following the Red 
Army’s diversionary offensive that had begun on 17.7.1943. The Soviet offensive had been 
designed to lure the strongest German armoured formations away from the Kharkov area 
prior to the major Soviet summer offensive in that sector (Operation Rumyantsev) which was 
to be launched on 3.8.43. This tactic proved entirely successful when the II SS Panzer Korps 
(now including the 3rd Panzer division as a replacement for the departing LSSAH) arrived on 
the Mius front (Figure 4).37
The Wochenmeldung alone provides us with the opportunity to establish the exact 
number of fully-tracked AVF (bar Pz I, self-propelled tank destroyers, artillery and heavy 
infantry guns) in the inventories of DR and SS-T directly after their participation in 
Operation Citadel (5–16 July 1943) and its immediate aftermath (17–20.7.43).38 From 
other sources we know the number of new deliveries of AFV the units of II SS Panzer 
Korps received at the front between the launch of Operation Citadel on 5.7.43 and the end 
of July. Therefore we can adjust the Wochenmeldung inventories accordingly to reflect the 
actual inventories of the SS divisions at the conclusion of Operation Citadel. The only new 
AFV despatched to the II SS Pz Korps were 5 Pz VI Tiger tanks which were received by the 
LSSAH on 25.7.43 (on 28.7.43 one of these new LSSAH Tigers was transferred to DR, while 
the other four were transferred to SS-T) and 4 Sf Pak which reached the LSSAH frontline 
sometime after 10.7.43. Having only departed Germany on 6.7.43 it is highly debatable 
whether these 4 new Sf Pak reached the LSSAH frontline troops prior to the battle of 
Prokhorovka on 12.7.43 (See Table 9 to 11).39
As the 1.8.43 Wochenmeldung is in reality a ‘ten-day’ status report for the armoured 
units of 6th Army the report also includes the origin and number of new AFV deliveries that 
had been received by each unit between 21.7–1.8.43 (in a similar way to the divisional ‘ten- 
36II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellung des II SS Panzer Korps am 29.7.3 und Verlauf des 30.7.43, T354, R606, F000050-51.
37Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 143–44; see also Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The 
Swing of the Pendulum: The Withdrawal of the Eastern Front from Summer 1943 to Summer 1944” in The Research 
Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 
1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2017), 338–43.
38AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441.
39Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. 
Regarding the transfer of LSSAH Tigers see Ben Wheatley, “Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured longevity on the 
Eastern Front 1943–1944,” Journal of Intelligence History, published online 2020, 36–37. As early as 29.6.43 the LSSAH 
daily AFV reports seem to contradict the more detailed LSSAH 1.7.43 inventory and 1.7.43 & 10.7.43 ten day AFV status 
reports by recording operational numbers above the 21 Sf Pak 75 mm in the division’s inventory, seemingly indicating 
the presence of 4 new Sf Pak. However, it is likely the LSSAH daily AFV reports are including Sf Pak which, although 
already issued to LSSAH (on 10.6.43), had not yet reached the troops on the frontline – or even left Germany (they 
departed 6.7.43)! Neither the 1.7.43 nor 10.7.43 ten day status reports record any new Sf Pak arriving at the front (the 
latter does include 16 new Pz IV), instead an inventory of 21 and 19 Sf Pak is respectively recorded. See PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, 
LSSAH, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1.7.43 & 
10.7.43, T313, R390 and II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH daily AFV reports 29.6–10.7.43, T354, R605, F000401-636.
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Figure 4. Army group south’s withdrawal operations to the Dnieper (17 July to 29 September 1943), 
source: map IV.III.1., Frieser, Karl-Heinz Germany and the Second World War volume VIII – The Eastern 
Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon press 2017). Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through 
PLSclear.
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day’ status reports). The Wochenmeldung therefore once again confirms that on 28.7.43 the 
LSSAH transferred the majority of its panzers to DR (4 Pz III, 39 Pz IV, 9 Pz VI) and SS-T 
(4 Pz III, 30 Pz IV, 8 Pz VI).43 We also have alternative documentary evidence that states the 
LSSAH passed a further 3 Pz III to the II SS Pz Korps HQ and retained 2 Pz I, 4 Pz II, 1 Pz 
III & 5 Pz IV as well as all its StuG assault guns and Sf Pak tank destroyers when it began its 
transfer to Italy on 29.7.1943.44 Neither DR nor SS-T received any other new AFV in 
July 1943.45 The result of the LSSAH additions to DR and SS-T inventories are as follows: 
Table 9. LSSAH new AFV deliveries July – October 1943.40
- Pz IV Pz V Pz VI StuG/StuH Pak Sf
July 16 (pre Citadel) 71 (joined LSSAH in Italy) 5 for LSSAH & 27 for 1 SS Pz  
Korps (latter joined LSSAH in Italy)
- 4 (mid July)
August 53 - - 9 StuH 6
September - - - - -
October 29 96 (Full exchange for  
unreliable 71 above)
- - -
Table 10. Das Reich new AFV deliveries July – October 1943.41
- Pz IV Pz V Pz VI StuG/StuH Pak Sf
July - 71 (entered combat with DR 22 Aug) - - -
August 10 (mid Aug) - - - -
September - 3 (recovery Panthers) 5 (did not arrive) - -
October 10 (early October did not  
reach front by 5.10.43)
- - - -
Table 11. Totenkopf new AFV deliveries July – October 1943.42
- Pz IV Pz V Pz VI StuG/StuH Pak Sf
July - - - - -
August - - - - -
September - - - - -
October 5 (early October did not reach 
front by 5.10.43) & 5 (mid-late 
Oct)
- 5 (either the re-routed DR shipment or 5 
assigned to AGS) reached front by 
5.10.43
-
40Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43 & 1.10.43, T78, R719; 
PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault 
gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website.
41Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website; 
PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 31.10.43, T313, R391.
42Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website; 
Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Truppen, Stabsoffizier für AOK 8, 5.10.43, T78, R619, F000836.
43AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441.
44PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 
12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. 
Bestandsmeldung. 10.7.43, T313, R390; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, 
updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH, Rgt.Bef.Std., 27.7.43, 
T354, R607, F000825; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; II SS 
Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; Images of the tanks retained by the 
LSSAH can be found on the following website: https://www.thirdreichmedals.com/article/WSS.html; Jentz, 
Thomas, (ed.) Panzer Truppen II, p.136; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and 
OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; See June/July 1943 delivery reports for 5 LSSAH Tigers, 4 LSSAH self- 
propelled guns and August delivery report for 53 LSSAH Pz IV on Sturmpanzer website; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391.
45See delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website.
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on 29.7.43 DR had 182 panzers and SS-T had 174 panzers.46 If we include assault guns and 
tank destroyers DR had a 226 AFV while SS-T had between 217–219 AFV.47
Panzer, Assault Gun and Tank Destroyer Losses
As the Wochenmeldung lists the number of AFV declared to be total losses between 
21.7–1.8.43 per unit, per type, it indicates the intensity of the fighting during the first few 
days of the Mius counter-offensive and in particular the battle for possession of the key 
Hill 213.9, which was finally captured on 1.8.1943 after a three day battle.48 The inclusion 
of the TF allows us to retrospectively add these losses back to the 1.8.43 DR and SS-T 
inventories in order to further establish both divisions’ inventory on 29.7.43, the day 
prior to the 30.7.43 launch of the Mius counter-offensive. If we then subtract the recent 
LSSAH additions to DR and SS-T we are presented with the final inventories of DR and 
SS-T following their deployment in the Belgorod/Prokhorovka area (Operation Citadel 
and its aftermath – DR 5–17.7.43 and SS-T 5–20.7.1943). Most significantly these figures 
match the number of panzers shown by Wochenmeldung as being in DR and SS-T 
inventories on 20.7.43 which is 130 and 132 AFV respectively. Clearly this further 
validates the 20.7.43 DR and SS-T inventory figures. When we compare the information 
in the Wochenmeldung with the 1–2.7.43 pre-Citadel inventories of the three SS divisions 
and the II SS Panzer Korps engineer’s report which covered losses of the korps in the 
Belgorod area between 5–18.7.1943 (updated with information received to 22.7.43) then 
we can see that in relation to SS-T the results are particularly illuminating.49
If we subtract from the 4.7.43 pre-Operation Citadel LSSAH inventory (118 Pz – not 
including light panzers) the II SS Panzer Korps engineer’s reported panzer losses (1 Pz III, 9 
Pz IV (2 of which were Homeland Maintenance), 1 Pz VI (Homeland Maintenance), 
118–11 = 107), the panzers passed to the II SS Panzer Korps HQ (3 Pz III, 107–3 = 104) 
and the small number of panzers that we know were retained by the LSSAH (1 Pz III, 5 Pz 
IV, 9 Bef, 104–15 = 89) then we are presented with the same number of panzers the 
Wochenmeldung declares the LSSAH handed over to DR and SS-T (8 Pz III, 69 Pz IV & 12 
Pz VI = 89, not including the 5 new Pz VI the LSSAH received on 25.7.43).50 This therefore 
46AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441.
47AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; II SS Panzer 
Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: 
Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, 
LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390.
48AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, War diary entries for 30.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000123-41.
49AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 
(written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 
10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu. 
V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T 
Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390.
50AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, 
R1483, F000441; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH 
written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. 
Bestandsmeldung. 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; 
II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH, Rgt.Bef.Std., 27.7.43, T354, R607, F000825; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 
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proves that the II SS Pz Korps engineer report gave the correct number of LSSAH losses for 
the period 5.7–18.7.43. However, some specific panzer ‘losses’ were ultimately replaced in 
the records, like for like, by a panzer of the same type. In practice this meant an additional 
tank being written off (either 3a or 3.b) while another which was at first considered a write 
off either physically or administratively returned to service. The author’s previous article 
showed AFV reclassifications were a fairly regular occurrence. For example, during 
Operation Citadel this occurred with LSSAH Pz III 77 604, and potentially with a LSSAH 
Pz VI – the ‘replacement’ loss for the latter stemming from the battle of Prokhorovka.51
In regards to the LSSAH assault guns the 1.9.43 divisional Meldung states that 
the LSSAH still had 32 StuG on hand which correctly matches the 3 total losses 
reported by the II SS Panzer Korps engineer. The LSSAH began Operation Citadel 
with 35 StuG.52 In terms of tank destroyers we know from the daily operational 
strength report of 24.7.43 that the LSSAH had all of its 22 Sf Pak operational, 
including the 4 new Sf Pak additions. This therefore confirms that the II SS Panzer 
Korps engineer correctly listed 3 Sf Pak as losses, 2 as a total loss and 1 in need of 
Homeland Maintenance repair (3.a). The LSSAH began Operation Citadel with 21 
Sf Pak in its inventory.53
The total number of panzers that the 6th Army’s Wochenmeldung stated Das Reich held 
in its inventory on 20.7.43 was 130, while on 1.8.43 the report declared that 182 panzers 
were with DR (the latter after retrospective addition of the 10 losses that appear in 
Wochenmeldung; these losses occurred between 30.7–1.8.43 during the Mius offensive, 
172 + 10 = 182). These figures match per tank type the 20.7.43 Wochenmeldung panzer 
inventory for DR (130, which was also DR final inventory following Operation Citadel) 
after we remove from the updated 1.8.43 figure the recent 28.7.43 LSSAH additions 
(182–52 = 130, 2 Pz III lg had been included, either in error or by design, alongside the 
division’s Bef Pz III).54 While if we remove the II SS Panzer Korps engineer reported losses 
and the 3 T-34 losses (together 12 total losses) from Das Reich’s pre-Operation Citadel 142 
strong panzer inventory (142–12 = 130) this also gives us the Wochenmeldung 20.7.43 
panzer inventory of 130.55 These calculations mutually corroborate in respect to DR panzer 
668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; 
Images of the tanks retained by the LSSAH can be found on the following website: https://www.thirdreichmedals.com/article/ 
WSS.html; Jentz, Thomas, (ed.) Panzer Truppen II, p.136; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB 
charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; See June/July 1943 delivery reports for 5 LSSAH Tigers, 4 LSSAH self-propelled guns and 
August delivery report for 53 LSSAH Pz IV on Sturmpanzer website; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 
1.11.43, T313, R391.
51See examples in Ben Wheatley, “Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured longevity on the Eastern Front 1943–1944,” 
Journal of Intelligence History, published online 2020, 14–16, 8–10 and article’s appendix.
52Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; 
PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390.
53II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; See June 1943 delivery report for 4 
LSSAH self-propelled guns on Sturmpanzer website; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 
5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Betr.: Totalausfälle 
an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (written 12.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. 
Bestandsmeldung. 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1.7.43, T313, R390. In 
relation to the arrival date of 4 new Sf Pak see footnote 37 above. It can reasonably be expected that the 4 new Sf 
Pak which left Germany on 6.7.43 would have reached the LSSAH troops by 24.7.43.
54AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441.
55AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 
(written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 
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inventory (per tank type) all elements of the 6th Army Wochenmeldung and the II SS 
Panzer Korps engineer’s reported losses.
By following the same formula we can see that the Wochenmeldung and the II SS 
Panzer Korps engineer report are also in alignment in respect to DR’s assault gun 
strength on 20.7.43 and 1.8.43 (both 32). Das Reich began Operation Citadel with 34 
StuG while the II SS Panzer Korps engineer reported 2 StuG losses.56 Although the 
Wochenmeldung did not record tank destroyer strengths we know that the II SS Panzer 
Korps engineer report was also correct to declare that DR suffered no Sf Pak losses during 
Operation Citadel. We know this as on 11.8.43 the division reported that all 12 of its Sf 
Pak were operational – no new Sf Pak were issued prior to this date.57
Therefore we can say with confidence that the II SS Panzer Korps engineer losses 
report is accurate in terms the number of declared AFV losses for both the LSSAH and 
DR for the period 5–18.7.43. The LSSAH and Das Reich along with the II SS Panzer 
Korps HQ withdrew from the front on 17.7.43. Given that the II SS Panzer Korps 
engineer report covered AFV reclassifications up to 22.7.43 this must have given ade-
quate time for an accurate report to be filed in regards to these two divisions (though of 
course as already mentioned like for like reclassifications in the report still occurred).
The Wochenmeldung also provides the first accurate account of the number of losses 
sustained by DR T-34’s during Operation Citadel. DR began Operation Citadel with 24 T-34 
in its inventory. The use of T-34 (reportedly obtained from a factory in Kharkov) by DR was 
a stop gap measure prior to the arrival of Das Reich’s Panther battalion (the Panthers entered 
combat west of Kharkov on 22 August 1943). The T-34’s were used extensively in the Mius 
counter attack. We know that DR lost 2 T-34 prior to the 11.7.43 as these appear in the 
5–10.7.43 DR and SS-T total loss report (Figure 5). The II SS Panzer Korps engineer loss 
report did not record DR’s T-34 losses. However, the fact that the 1.8.43 Wochenmeldung 
states DR had an inventory of 21, indicates that 1 further T-34 was lost between 11–20.7.43.58 
Each of DR T-34 had undergone fairly extensive reconditioning prior to Operation Citadel. 
For example they were converted to carry a two-way radio. Therefore it is extremely doubtful 
that DR had the time to adapt any further T-34 as replacements during this period as the 
repair troops would have had other priorities.59
What is perhaps most interesting about the 6th Army Wochenmeldung is that unlike 
the LSSAH & DR elements of the report those regarding SS-T for 20.7.43 and 1.8.43 
(again including the 30.7–1.8.43 Mius offensive losses) do not align with the II SS Panzer 
1–10.7.43 (DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1.7.43 & 
10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1.7.43, T313, R390.
56Ibid.
57II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43 (DR & SS-T 
Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; 
PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1.7.43, T313, R390; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR 
Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201.
58AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 
28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43 
(DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1.7.43 & 10.7.43, 
T313, R390; II SS Panzer Korps, see T-34 amongst DR vanguard units for Mius counter-offensive, 28.7.43, T354, R605, 
F000888-89; Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2007), 24–25 & 61–63.
59Chamberlain, Peter, and Doyle, Hilary, Encyclopaedia of German Tanks of World War Two (London: Arms & Armour 2001), 
238–39.
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Korps engineer report after the latter’s reported losses have been subtracted from SS-T’s 
pre-Operation Citadel inventory. The SS-T Wochenmeldung status for 20.7.43 and 1.8.43 
tell us that, when compared with the 5–10.7.43 SS-T total loss report, SS-T in fact lost no 
panzers between 11–20.7.43 – a quite remarkable revelation.60
The total number of panzers the 6th Army Wochenmeldung declared SS-T possessed on 
1.8.43 was 174 (after the retrospective addition of the 15 Mius offensive losses of 30.7– 
1.8.43, 159 + 15 = 174). After the removal of the recent 42 LSSAH additions from this figure 
(174–42 = 132) we are given the number of panzers shown as being in the Wochenmeldung 
SS-T inventory on 20.7.43 which was 132. The II SS Panzer Korps engineer reported a total 
of 12 SS-T panzers as being lost between 5–18.7.43, while SS-T pre-Operation Citadel 
panzer inventory stood at 139. However, when we subtract 12 tanks from the pre- 
Operation Citadel inventory of 139 (139–12 = 127) we can see that there is a five tank 
deficit between the 132 panzer inventory total reported in the 20.7.43 Wochenmeldung. The 
5–10.7.43 DR and SS-T loss report and the 1–10.7.43 SS-T ten day status report both 
confirm that SS-T lost 7 panzers in the early part of Operation Citadel, which meant SS-T 
Figure 5. Extract showing majority of DR panzer losses 5–10.7.43: PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR and SS-T, Betr.: 
Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, Lageskizzen written 23.7.43, T313, R390 DR other 
AFV loss during this period Pz III 73 102 can be found on a separate page.
60AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 
(written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 
1–10.7.43 (DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, SS-T Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1.7.43 
& 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 2.7.43, T313, R390.
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closed 10.7.43 with a panzer inventory of 132, which is of course the same total reported by 
the 20.7.43 Wochenmeldung status report (Table 12 and Figure 6).61
The Wochenmeldung SS-T status of 20.7.43 cannot in fact be a delayed (or duplicated) 
reporting of SS-T’s earlier 10.7.43 status report as quite obviously the distribution of 
panzers in the 1.8.43 status would also be in error. The distribution of panzers on 1.8.43 
into categories of operational, short-term damaged, long-term damaged, new and lost 
panzers has clearly been undertaken in great detail. This information could only have been 
offered on or after the 1.8.43. The fact that the 1.8.43 SS-T panzer status can then be traced 
back accurately to 20.7.43 by removing the various losses and new additions between those 
dates proves that the 20.7.43 Wochenmeldung figure for SS-T is indeed factual.63
The fact that the LSSAH and DR elements of the Wochenmeldung and the II SS Panzer 
Korps engineer report are in alignment gives us confidence that the Wochenmeldung is 
overall an accurate document. The Wochenmeldung status report for 1.8.43 reported that 
total losses in the first three days (by far the most intense period) of the four day battle on 
the Mius were as follows: for Das Reich 4 Pz III and 6 Pz IV. The DR Pz III figure is 
unclear in the original document – but this has been substantiated by removing the 
clearly stated 6 Pz IV losses from the 29.7.43 DR panzer inventory total of 182 (182– 
6 = 176) which means 4 Pz III must have also been lost in order for the confirmed 1.8.43 
panzer inventory total of 172 to be met. Totenkopf lost: 4 Pz III lg, 9 Pz IV lg and 2 Pz IV 
kz. Clearly the short Mius offensive was proving very costly for both of the SS divisions.64 
The intensity of the fighting on the first day of the battle for Hill 213.9 is highlighted by 
a 23:30 30.7.43 II SS Panzer Korps loss report that stated that DR suffered 25 panzers lost 
or damaged, whilst the same report declared SS-T had suffered as many as 48 panzers 
(including 8 Tigers) and 12 StuG lost or damaged (Figure 7 to 10).65
Given the high number of AFV causalities SS-T had suffered between 30.7–1.8.43 and the 
knowledge that SS-T had not engaged in any serious fighting between 19–29.7.43 one has to 
conclude that all of SS-T 21.7–1.8.43 reported losses must have occurred following the 
commencement of the Mius offensive on 30.7.43 and were not late additions from the 
Table 12. Reported total losses of II SS Panzer Korps during operation Citadel 5–10.7.43.62
- Pz I Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI StuG Sf Pak
LSSAH 15 014 77 604 84 088 92 150 1 851
83 291 91 143 1 821
83 181
83 293
Das Reich 73 102 (514) 84 223 (823) 19 (L14) 250 085 (S24)
72 267 (902) 84 231 (832) 15 (932)
Totenkopf 77 603 84 245 (323) 250 095 92 247




62PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, 
DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390.
63Ibid.
64AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441.
65II SS Panzer Korps, Meldung über Verluste, durchgegeben am 30.7, 23,30 Uhr, Fernmündl. An 0 1 AOK..6,T354, R605, 
F000940.









































Citadel era. SS-T losses during the Mius offensive were greater than DR due to the fact that 
SS-T conducted a costly frontal assault on the extremely well fortified and defended Hill 
213.9, Das Reich was attempting to outflank the hill from the south and as a result avoided 
the worst fighting.66
Figure 7. SS-T assault on Hill 213.9, 30.7.43. II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellung des II SS Panzer Korps am 
29.7.3 und Verlauf des 30.7.43, T354, R606, F000050-51.
66AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Meldung über Verluste, durchgegeben am 30.7, 23,30 Uhr, Fernmündl. An 0 1 
AOK..6,T354, R605, F000940; II SS Panzer Korps, War diary entries for 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000104-41; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Bereitstellung des II SS Panzer Korps am 29.7.3 und Verlauf des 30.7.43, T354, R606, F000050-51; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Verlauf des 31.7.43, T354, R606, F000052-53; II SS Panzer Korps, Verlauf des 1.8.43, T354, R606, F000055-56; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Verlauf des 2.8.43, T354, R606, F000059.
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Figure 8. SS-T assault on Hill 213.9, 31.7.43. II SS Panzer Korps, Verlauf des 31.7.43, T354, R606, 
F000052-53.
Figure 9. SS-T capture of Hill 213.9, 1.8.43. II SS Panzer Korps, Verlauf des 1.8.43, T354, R606, F000055-56.
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Supporting evidence
We shall now explore a number of factors that help us understand why there is 
a discrepancy between the II SS Panzer Korps engineer’s reported panzer losses for SS- 
T and the post-Citadel inventories for 20.7.43 and 1.8.43 for the same division that can be 
found in the 6th Army’s Wochenmeldung.67
On 17.7.43 the II SS Panzer Korps HQ (along with the korps engineer), the LSSAH and 
DR disengaged from the front. On 18.7.43 (Figure 11 and 12) these units then began 
travelling to 1st Panzer Army sector in order to prepare to face the forming Soviet 
bridgehead on the Donets. As a result SS-T was from 18.7.43 no longer under the II SS 
Panzer Korps control. Instead SS-T fought further defensive battles until 20.7.43 under the 
control of XXXXVIII Panzer Korps on which date it also disengaged and began to be 
transported south to 6th Army’s sector – where it would rejoin the II SS Panzer Korps 
prior to the Mius attack. As a result from 18.7.43 there was a physical separation between 
II SS Panzer Korps engineer and SS-T that simply did not exist between II SS Panzer Korps 
engineer and the LSSAH & DR. This may have had a bearing on the ability of II SS Panzer 
Korps engineer to source up to date and accurate information regarding SS-T AFV losses. 
Although the II SS Panzer Korps engineer made amendments to his report until 22.7.43 
this is unlikely to have improved matters in regards to SS-T as by this stage all three 
divisions & the II SS Panzer Korps HQ were in the midst of a transport either to 1st Panzer 
Army on the Donets (HQ, LSSAH & DR) or 6th Army on the Mius (SS-T).68
Figure 10. SS-T advance to the Mius, 2.8.43. II SS Panzer Korps, Verlauf des 2.8.43, T354, R606, 
F000059.
67AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 
(written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31.
68II SS Panzer Korps, War diary entries for 17.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000100-41; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII.Pz-AK daily 
reports relating to Totenkopf 18–20.7.43, T314, R1171, F000388-482; II SS Panzer Korps, Map of korps actions, new and 
proposed front lines 14–18.7.43, T354, R606, F000035; II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer 
Korps, 18–22.7.43, T354, R606, F000038; II SS Panzer Korps, Gliederung des II SS Panzer Korps am 22 und 23.7.43 bis zur 
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The 18.7.43 was the final day that SS-T’s panzer regiment was engaged in any major 
defensive operations. On 19.7.43 it may have been called upon to repel a minor attack of 
15 Soviet tanks (apparently 8 Soviet tanks were destroyed), while on 20.7.43 SS-T’s 
Panzer Regiment did not engage in any action prior to its departure from 4th Panzer 
Army control at 21:00 that night. Therefore SS-T AFV losses between 19–20.7.43 are 
extremely unlikely to have occurred. As SS-T compiled its own status reports, the 
division would have had plenty of time to source and report correct AFV information 
Figure 11. II SS Panzer Korps, map of korps actions, new and proposed front lines 14–18.7.43, T354, 
R606, F000035.
Bereitstellung und Lage bei XXXX.A.K., T354, R606, F000039; II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellungs u. Angriffsplan für den 
Angriff am 24.7.43, T354, R606, F000040; II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer Korps, 
24–29.7.43, T354, R606, F000043; II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellung des II SS Panzer Korps am 29.7.3 und Verlauf des 
30.7.43, T354, R606, F000050-51; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und 
Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz 
Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31.
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to its controlling korps (XXXXVIII Panzer Korps) and army (4th Panzer Army) prior to 
the 20.7.43 status report being issued. However, at this stage we cannot say for sure which 
controlling staff actually issued the original 20.7.43 status report. As already mentioned 
SS-T left XXXXVIII Panzer Korps and 4th Panzer Army control on the evening 20.7.43 to 
begin its transfer south to the Mius. Therefore we are extremely fortunate that the 20.7.43 
status for SS-T is included in the 1.8.43 6th Army Wochenmeldung.69
Figure 12. II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer Korps, 18–22.7.43, T354, 
R606, F000038.
69Ibid.
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In the event on 24.7.43 Hitler cancelled the 1st Panzer Army’s Donets operation at the 
last moment with the LSSAH and DR already in their assembly areas for the offensive 
(Figure 13 the Soviet bridgehead had been contained prior to the LSSAH and DR arrival). 
Both divisions then continued south to 6th Army’s sector arriving on 25–26.7.43. Totenkopf 
due to transportation delays did not arrive with 6th Army until 26–27.7.43 (Figure 14). 
Therefore the physical separation between SS-T and the II SS Panzer Korps engineer 
stretched between 18–26.7.43. The various transports which took place over this period 
would have hardly aided the II SS Panzer Korps HQ’s effective evaluation of SS-T AFV 
status. It seems a real possibility that the II SS Panzer Korps engineer, due to his remoteness 
from SS-T, was out of touch with the real situation on the ground in regards to SS-T AFV 
losses in the latter stages of Operation Citadel and the offensive’s immediate aftermath.70
The II SS Panzer Korps engineer’s report makes clear that some of SS-T tanks (1 Pz III & 
1 Pz IV) which were initially recorded as total losses had in fact already been recovered and 
repaired. This obviously sets a precedent for errors in the reporting of SS-T AFV losses in 
the report; perhaps pertinently no such errors were reported by the engineer in regards to 
the LSSAH or DR losses. As the author’s previous article made clear AFV damage/loss 
classifications were in a constant state of flux. There were many examples of panzers 
initially being reported as total losses (3b) only to be later reclassified as needing factory 
repair (3a) or even rapidly returning to service. There are also instances of tanks despite 
being listed as TF or requiring factory repair remaining in divisional inventories. Therefore 
no loss report should ever be considered to be 100% accurate. However, it is unlikely that as 
many as 5 SS-T panzers were reclassified from lost to damaged or operational over this 
period. Single adjustments were commonplace but relatively large post-battle adjustments 
Figure 13. LSSAH and DR plan of attack with 1st Panzer Army, 24.7.43. II SS Panzer Korps, 
Bereitstellungs u. Angriffsplan für den Angriff am 24.7.43, T354, R606, F000040.
70Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Swing of the Pendulum: The Withdrawal of the Eastern Front from Summer 1943 to Summer 
1944” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – 
The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 339–41; II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellungs u. Angriffsplan für den Angriff am 24.7.43, 
T354, R606, F000040; II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer Korps, 24–29.7.43, T354, R606, 
F000043.
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are unlikely to have occurred. It is more likely the report was simply incorrect regarding SS- 
T losses. It is also possible that having left the front on 17–18.7.43 the II SS Panzer Korps 
engineer was lacking a direct report from SS-T in regards to SS-T AFV losses and was 
forced to work with outdated or erroneous information.71
Another indicator that points to the greater accuracy of the Wochenmeldung over the II 
SS Panzer Korps engineer’s loss report (in regards to SS-T AFV losses) can be seen when 
one compares the 5–10.7.43 total loss (chassis numbers) report for DR & SS-T (that the II 
SS Panzer Korps supplied to 4th Panzer Army) with the divisional losses reported by Army 
Group South to the General Inspector of Panzer Troops’ Office for the same period.72
In terms of the number (a couple of panzers chassis numbers are incorrectly listed) of 
AFV reported in the combined 5–10.7.43 DR & SS-T total loss report over this period, the 
figures for DR match the known sources, meaning it is likely that this document is also 
correct for SS-T. Therefore we can say with relative confidence that SS-T lost 2 Pz III, 4 Pz 
IV and 1 Pz VI between 5–10.7.43. As we have seen this would mean that according to the 
6th Army Wochenmeldung SS-T lost no further panzers after the 10.7.1943 during 
Figure 14. II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer Korps, 24–29.7.43, T354, 
R606, F000043.
71II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F00044; See examples reclassifications in Ben Wheatley, “Surviving Prokhorovka: German 
Armoured longevity on the Eastern Front 1943–1944,” Journal of Intelligence History, published online 2020, 14–16, 
8–10 and article’s appendix.
72II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F00044; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. 
Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR 
& SS-T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 
1–2.7.43, T313, R390; Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RH 10/64, General Inspector of Panzer Troops – AGS, 5–10.7.43 
Totalverluste, see also: 5–13.7.43, 5–14.7.43, 5–15.7.43, 5–16.7.43 and 5–17.7.43 editions.
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Operation Citadel. This is despite the II SS Panzer Korps engineer’s report alluding to 
a further loss of 3 Pz III and 2 Pz IV.73
There are also a few indicators that support the belief that no SS-T post-10.7.1943 total 
losses occurred during Operation Citadel. Firstly the 5–17.7.43 Army Group South loss 
report that was sent to the General Inspector of Panzer Troops Office lists only 2 Pz III as 
being lost by SS-T throughout Operation Citadel. Secondly, although the same 5–17.7.43 
Army Group South loss report lists 8 Pz IV losses, they are all recorded in the in Army 
Group South’s 5–10.7.43 edition (Table 13). Therefore, although the number of losses in 
5–10.7.43 Army Group South loss report may not be in alignment with the 5–10.7.43 DR 
& SS-T (chassis number) total loss report. The clear implication is that no SS-T losses 
occurred after 10.7.43. This perhaps indicates the true chronology of SS-T losses i.e. they 
all occurred between 5–10.7.43.74 We also know that SS-T withdrew in good order from 
its bridgehead across the river Psel on the night of 17–18.7.43 (for example the division 
even had time to deconstruct its bridging equipment) so perhaps some of the panzers 
which the II SS Panzer Korps engineer believed were total losses on the far side of the Psel 
were in fact recovered and remained in SS-T inventory beyond 20.7.43.75
The confirmed knowledge that the II SS Panzer Korps engineer’s report concerning 
SS-T AFV losses in the latter half of the Operation Citadel (post-10.7.43) is inaccurate 
further raises the possibility that the II SS Panzer Korps engineer had not yet recorded 
a LSSAH Tiger tank as a total loss following the battle of Prokhorovka. A LSSAH Tiger 
tank was said to have been immobilised close to SS-T troops during the battle of 
Prokhorovka on 12.7.43. Any immobilised LSSAH Tiger would have remained close to 
SS-T’s frontage after 12.7.43 until SS-T withdrew from the area on the night of 18/19.7.43. 
We know roughly the location of the 4 operational LSSAH Tigers on 12.7.43 as the tanks 
had to crest a hill in order to bring the known Soviet tank wrecks near Andreyevka into 
their line of fire – this was the LSSAH Tiger tanks’ second battle of the day. The II SS 
Panzer Korps engineer would have been just as susceptible to the same lack of clarity as to 
the ultimate fate of an LSSAH ‘Prokhorovka’ Tiger tank located in SS-T’s sector of 
operations as he would have been with panzers that belonged to SS-T. It is also very 
possible that the LSSAH Tiger tank that the II SS Panzer Korps engineer reported as 
Table 13. General Inspector of the Panzer Troops- Totalverluste – Army group south – operation 
Citadel – 5-17.7.43.76
- LSSAH DR SS-T
- Pz III Pz IV Pz VI Pz III Pz IV Pz VI Pz III Pz IV Pz VI
5–10.7.43 1 5 1 1 8 1
5–13.7.43 1 7 1 1 1 2 8 1
5–14.7.43 1 9 1 1 1 2 8 1
5–15.7.43 1 9 1 1 6 1 2 8 1
5–16.7.43 1 9 1 1 6 1 2 8 1
5–17.7.43 1 9 1 1 6 1 2 8 1
Final Total 1 9 1 1 6 1 2 8 1
73Ibid.
74Ibid.
75II SS Panzer Korps, War diary entries for 17–19.7.43, T354, R605, F000100-110; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII.Pz-AK daily 
reports relating to Totenkopf 18–20.7.43, T314, R1171, F000388-482.
76Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RH 10/64, General Inspector of Panzer Troops – AGS, 5–10.7.43 Totalverluste, see also: 
5–13.7.43, 5–14.7.43, 5–15.7.43, 5–16.7.43 and 5–17.7.43 editions.
28 B. WHEATLEY
requiring homeland maintenance (see also LSSAH 1–10.7.43 ten day status report in 
Figure 17.) remained against regulations in the LSSAH inventory (we know for example 
that a SS-T Tiger took a similar path in the spring of 1943) and was transferred in its 
current state of repair to DR or SS-T’s inventory on 28.7.43. On 28.7.43 DR received 8 
Citadel era LSSAH Tigers (& 1 new), while SS-T took on 4 Citadel era LSSAH Tigers (& 4 
new).77
The issue of units refusing to turn over heavily damaged AFV (for fear of receiving no 
replacement) to homeland maintenance became so acute that ultimately an order had to 
be issued that stipulated that AFV requiring homeland maintenance would officially be 
allowed to remain the property of their parent division. On 21.10.43 OKH/GenStdH/ 
GenQu/Abt.III stated: ‘The armoured vehicles sent to the homeland for maintenance 
henceforth remain property of the delivering troop outfit and will be returned to it after 
maintenance has been carried out.’78 As we have seen with the example of SS-T in the 
spring of 1943 (at least in regards to SS Tigers) this practice was already taking place.
The II SS Panzer Korps engineer report also declared that SS-T lost 2 Sf Pak as total 
losses. We are still not in a position to confirm whether two Sf Pak were lost during the 
latter part of operation Citadel (11–18.7.43) or later on the Mius front. However, 
a shortage report after the Mius offensive, which declared how far below establishment 
SS-T was, stated that the division was short of 1 Sf Pak. Given that official establishment 
(Soll) was 10 Sf Pak, we can see that SS-T must have ended the Mius battle with 9 Sf Pak 
(SS-T began Citadel with 11 Sf Pak). One of 9 Sf Pak was under long-term repair. We 
know this as the divisional Meldung and OB chart for 1.8.43 declared that 8 Sf Pak were 
available to the division (in this case operational or under 3 weeks repair – the OB chart 
did not list SS-T panzer strengths). The II SS Panzer Korps engineer report does correctly 
state that SS-T lost 1 StuG during this period (recorded as occurring between 5–10.7.43) 
which tallies with the inventory of 34 shown in the 1.8.43 Wochenmeldung.79
The daily divisional reports during the Mius offensive list SS-T as having only 
a limited number of operational Pz III. On 1.8.43 this number was as low as 5, whereas 
on the same date the Wochenmeldung lists 40 Pz III as being operational (albeit listed in 
error as Pz III 75 mm kz – SS-T only possessed Pz III with long barrelled 50 mm 
weapons). The most likely reason for the large difference in the number of operational 
Pz III in the reports is that only a proportion were committed to the battle area. The daily 
divisional report for 28.7.43 declared that SS-T had 52 Pz III lg operational, while the 
declared operational numbers of the other panzer types in the Wochenmeldung are in 
broad aliment with the daily divisional reports for 1.8.43. No new panzer crews 
77See section The Tiger on the Hill – was a LSSAH Tiger lost at Prokhorovka in Ben Wheatley, “Surviving Prokhorovka: 
German Armoured longevity on the Eastern Front 1943–1944,” Journal of Intelligence History, published online 2020, 
24–32.
78Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers: German Tank Maintenance in World War 2, Vol 2. (Monroe: Panzerwrecks Publishing 
2011), 235.
79AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; II SS Panzer 
Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: 
Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional 
Meldung and OB charts, SS-T, 1.8.43, T78, R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. 
Kfz. 1–10.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 
1–2.7.43, T313, R390.
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accompanied the transfer of LSSAH armour to DR and SS-T on 28.7.43. Therefore it is 
probable that a large number of former SS-T Pz III crews were switched to manning the 
far more potent additional 30 long barrelled Pz IV that had been transferred from the 
LSSAH. Further evidence that SS-T did in fact have a larger number of operational Pz III 
than were committed to the Mius offensive can be located in a monthly report of the 
General Inspector of Panzer Troops which was also issued on 1.8.43. The report declared 
that SS-T had 49 operational Pz III (including Bef Pz. This report however, did not 
include AFV in long-term repair – in this case over 3 weeks). There are number of errors 
in the figures presented in the General Inspector of Panzer Troops’ report – for example 
the report lists SS-T as having 49 StuG operational and 21 StuG under 3 weeks repair, 
while 10 Pz VI were reported as operational and 18 under 3 weeks repair. However, 
despite these and other errors the panzer inspector’s report does at least provide further 
evidence that SS-T had not committed a good proportion of its operational Pz III to the 
Mius battle. Therefore, it seems that the daily SS-T reports during the Mius battle were 
ignoring the additional operational Pz III in their reports.80
A ‘lost’ counter-offensive at Kharkov – August 1943
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had been prepared both during and after Operation 
Citadel to allow the Red Army a free hand in the southern sectors of his army group in 
return for a concentrated effort during the battle of Kursk. In May 1943 Manstein 
declared:
in the case of Citadel the decisive factor is the battle for Kursk, and that battle must be fought 
out even at the risk of a serious crisis in the Donets area. It must therefore be assumed at the 
outset that the enemy will succeed in making deep breaches in the Army Group’s widely 
stretched front in the sectors of 6th Army and 1st Panzer Army81
As Karl-Heinz Frieser has succinctly written:
Manstein developed the brilliant idea that the battle on the Mius had to be fought at Kursk. 
There, by tying down and destroying the largest possible amount of enemy forces, the risk of 
offensives on other sections of the front could be averted. His idea was to force the Red Army 
to throw so many tanks into the Kursk caldron that it would be unable to launch its planned 
summer offensive or would be able to do so only with insufficient forces. That this was by no 
means absurd is shown by the strikingly high number of Soviet losses. The Soviet colossus was 
dangerous only if it was able to throw its numerical superiority into the balance – especially its 
strongest weapon, the artillery – in a properly prepared attack. At Kursk, however, there was 
a chance of entangling the Soviets armoured units in meeting engagements in which the 
German tank commanders would be able to exploit their tactical superiority.82
To a great extent this is indeed what occurred, as despite Vatutin’s defensive deployment 
during Operation Citadel, Soviet armour suffered catastrophic losses. The tank units of 
80AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 
2000), 218–19; II SS Panzer Korps, Daily report for SS-T, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000886; II SS Panzer Korps, Daily report, 
1.8.43, T354, R605, F000970-71.
81Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 




6th & 7th Army were largely destroyed in the first two days of the offensive. By 10.7.43 1st 
Tank Army had shrunk from an original 646 to 100 tanks and assault guns. Up to and 
including 13.7.43, Voronezh Front (together with reserves brought in) lost a total of 1,223 
tanks and assault guns (1,397 tanks and 33 assault guns up to 22.7.43). A large proportion 
of those losses were incurred in the first few days of the battle. By contrast, up to and 
including 10.7.43 the attacking units of Army Group South lost only 116 tanks and 
assault guns in all (175 tanks and assault guns up to 17.7.43), although they had to fight 
their way through enemy positions under the most adverse conditions.83
As a result following the battle of Prokhorovka Manstein hoped to put this concept 
further into practice by launching Operation Roland. The operation was intended to shift 
the main effort of the attack to the north-west away from Prokhorovka (Soviet anti-tank 
strength and continuing high numbers of operational Soviet tanks prohibited any further 
attempt to reach Prokhorovka) in the direction of Oboyan. In this way Manstein hoped 
to inflict even greater losses on the Soviet armoured reserves. If we look at the recovering 
operational armoured strength of the LSSAH and Das Reich on 18.7.43 (the intended 
start date of the offensive) then we can see that the German attack would have carried 
significant force (see Table 15). However, on 13.7.43 to Manstein’s dismay Hitler decided 
to abandon Operational Citadel (the massive Soviet offensive against the Orel salient 
having begun on 12.7.43), withdraw the II SS Panzer Korps and to dismiss Manstein’s 
proposal for Operation Roland. Hitler wanted to send the II SS Panzer Korps to Italy on 
a political mission to bolster his Axis partner’s faltering resolve to fight. From 17.7.43 
Hitler would also be distracted by the economic arguments for protecting the industry in 
the Donets Basin with the II SS Panzer Korps (See Table 14 to 18).84
Table 14. II SS Panzer Korps – pre-operation Roland AFV inventory (ca 18–19.7.43).85
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Inventory 01:00 19.7.43 (following Citadel) 12 74 12 9 107 32 22* 161
DR Inventory 01:00 19.7.43 (following Citadel) 60 27 21 13 9 130 32 12 174
SS-T Inventory at 01:00 21.7.43 (following Citadel) 61 48 14 9 132 34 9–11# 175–177
Total 133 149 21 39 27 369 98 43–45 510–512
83Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 117 & 150–52.
84XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII.Pz-AK preparations for Operation Roland 16.7.43, T314, R1171, F000361-63; II SS Panzer Korps, 
War diary entries regarding Operation Roland preparations 17–19.7.43, T354, R605, F000097-102; Frieser, Karl-Heinz, 
“The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second 
World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 138–45.
85PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an 
Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; 
II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH 
Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, 
R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, 
R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, 
assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. *Includes 4 new LSSAH Pak Sf. 
#*2 Pak SF lost sometime between 11.7.43 and end of Mius operation.
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During the battle of Kursk it would have been to Germany’s advantage for Army 
Group South to retain as many of its panzer units in the Kharkov area throughout the 
battle, which of course included the defence of Kharkov itself. If loss of territory away 
from the centre of gravity on the Eastern Front (Kursk/Kharkov) was the inevitable 
Table 16. II SS Panzer Korps – peak operational AFV numbers following operation Citadel.87
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Operational 24.7.43 7 55 10 6 78 30 22 130
DR Operational 18.7.43 36 24 17 9 7 93 28 10 131
SS-T Operational 28.7.43 52 32 5 5 94 26 6* 126*
Total 95 111 17 24 18 265 84 38 387
Table 17. II SS Panzer Korps AFV inventory prior to LSSAH transfer and Mius offensive (30.7.43).88
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Inventory 27.7.43 (did not participate) 12 74 17 9 112 32 22 166
DR Inventory 27.7.43 60 27 21 13 9 130 32 12 174
SS-T Inventory 27.7.43 61 48 14 9 132 34 9–11* 175–177
Total 133 149 21 44 27 374 98 43–45 515–517
Table 15. II SS Panzer Korps – pre-operation Roland operational AFV (ca 18–19.7.43).86
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Operational 19:25 18.7.43 7 55 9 8 79 28 16 123
DR Operational 19:25 18.7.43 36 24 17 9 7 93 28 10 131
SS-T Operational 19:25 18.7.43 30 29 7 7 73 20 3 96
Total 73 108 17 25 22 245 76 29 350
Table 18. II SS Panzer Korps operational AFV prior to LSSAH transfer and Mius offensive (30.7.43).89
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH Operational 24.7.43 7 55 10 6 78 30 22 130
DR Operational 28.7.43 (not including LSSAH Pz) 33 17 2 6 3 61 28 11* 100
SS-T Operational 28.7.43 (not including LSSAH Pz) 52 32 5 5 94 26 6# 126#
Total 92 104 2 21 14 233 84 39 356
86Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 187–88; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, Daily 
reports for SS-T 18–20.7.43, T314, R1171, F000388-482.
87II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982. *Unlikely to be less than 
6 as this number of SS-T Pak Sf was operational on 31.7.43.
88PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an 
Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps,; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 
11.8.43, T314, R201; II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS 
Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 
668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, 
LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports 
for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. *2 Pak SF lost 
sometime between 11.7.43 and end of Mius operation.
89II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982. *Previous day. #Unlikely 
to be less than 6 as this number of SS-T Pak Sf was operational on 31.7.43.
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consequence of this decision, then that should have been a price worth paying.90 Despite 
the cancelation of Operations Citadel and Roland, Hitler should have been able to 
recognise the absolute necessity of keeping an intact II SS Panzer Korps in the region, 
in order that it could be immediately deployed in the defence of Kharkov. Instead of 
sending its divisions to 1st Panzer Army and 6th Army, the German High Command 
would have been better served allowing the II SS Panzer Korps to rest its troops, repair 
the majority of its damaged AFV and then become the main armoured reserve of Army 
Group South in the Kharkov area. By mid-July 1943 it was obvious that Kharkov was 
going to be the target of the next major Soviet offensive. Had Hitler allowed Manstein to 
deploy a near full strength and concentrated II SS Panzer Korps in a major counter-attack 
into the flank of the advancing Soviet armoured formations, then this would have caused 
untold damaged to the Soviets’ plans to rapidly retake Kharkov.
The deployment of Army Group South’s reserve, XXIV Panzer Korps, to the south 
allowed the 17.7.43 Soviet offensives in 1st Panzer Army (SS Panzergrenadier Division 
Wiking and 17th Panzer Division – Donets) and 6th Army’s (23rd Panzer Division – Mius) 
sectors to be contained. Given the dire strategic situation on the Eastern Front, the fact 
that without further reinforcements (II SS Panzer Korps) neither of the Soviet bridge-
heads could be crushed seems of little relevance. As a result Manstein’s overall strategy of 
concentration at Kursk, which included the II SS Panzer Korps, need not have been 
impeded.91
Although the II SS Panzer Korps (minus the LSSAH) did eventually manage to crush 
the Soviet bridgehead on the Mius, in reality the operation (along with Hitler’s insistence 
of sending the LSSAH and II SS Panzer Korps HQ to Italy) had a ‘disastrous’ effect on the 
Germans ability to resist the major Soviet offensive against Kharkov (Operation 
Rumyantsev) which began on 3.8.43. The decision to relocate the II SS Panzer Korps 
removed the most powerful panzer korps at Germany’s disposal away from the centre of 
gravity on the Eastern Front and reduced the number of AFV repairs that could 
realistically be expected to be completed. The SS divisions near constant transportations 
in the latter half of July and the accompanying departure away from the main concen-
tration of spare parts on the Eastern Front impeded the repair services work (particularly 
regarding DR). Furthermore, the resulting Mius counter-offensive severely reduced DR 
and SS-T AFV operational readiness for the battle of Kharkov as both divisions suffered 
a large number of damaged tanks, while over 25 AFV were lost.92
90Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 144.
91Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Swing of the Pendulum: The Withdrawal of the Eastern Front from Summer 1943 to 
Summer 1944” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World 
War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 338–41; Rebentisch, Ernst, The Combat History of the 23rd Panzer 
Division (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books 2012), 280–85. The 6th Army Wochenmeldung über Panzer und 
Sturmgeschülzlage Stand for 20.7.43 and 1.8.43 shows that containing the 17–24.7.43 Soviet offensive cost 
the 16th Panzergrenadier Division 13 tanks and the 23rd Panzer Division 12 tanks. See AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, 
Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 20.7.43 T312, R1483, F000417 and 
1.8.43, T312, R1483, F000441.
92II SS Panzer Korps, War diary entries for 30.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000123-41; Manstein, Erich von, Lost Victories, 
(Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1982), 452; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und 
Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Map of korps actions, new 
and proposed front lines 14–18.7.43, T354, R606, F000035; II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS 
Panzer Korps, 18–22.7.43, T354, R606, F000038; II SS Panzer Korps, Gliederung des II SS Panzer Korps am 22 und 23.7.43 
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In addition even though the vast majority of LSSAH panzers were left on the Eastern 
Front to boost the inventories of DR and SS-T, in real terms there was a loss of panzer 
strength. As already mentioned, DR and SS-T clearly did not have enough crews to man 
the additional panzers prior to the start of the Mius counter attack. The loss of the 
experienced LSSAH tank crews would prove particularly damaging throughout the rest 
of the battle of Kursk. In addition, the Eastern Front was also shorn of the LSSAH assault 
gun battalion, its 22 strong tank destroyer battalion and the division’s returning I Panzer 
Battalion which was on the cusp of becoming operational with 71 (granted mechanically 
unreliable) Panther tanks. The LSSAH I Panzer Battalion would have been ready for 
action in the Kharkov area around 19.8.43. Its preparation for combat was reported to be 
three days ahead of DR’ s own Panther battalion which entered combat on 22.8.43.93
As a result of these negative developments, when DR and SS-T did finally launch 
a coordinated counter attack west of Kharkov on 12.8.43, they did so with just 155 
operational AFV.94 By contrast, just prior to the LSSAH departure on 28.7.43, the II SS 
Panzer Korps had 356 operational AFV.95 Therefore the combination of Hitler’s decision 
to send the LSSAH to Italy and the undertaking of the unnecessary Mius offensive meant 
the SS counter-attack at Kharkov on 12.8.43 was reduced in strength by at least 200 
operational AFV. To put this into context, as a consequence of the German high 
command’s decision to strip away many of Army Group South armoured formations 
following the termination of Operation Citadel, the entire German defence (4th Panzer 
Army and Army Detachment Kempf) against the 3.8.43 Soviet Kharkov offensive pos-
sessed only 237 operational AFV. A week later on 10.8.43, after five additional armoured 
divisions (including DR and SS-T) had been rushed to the Kharkov area, the Germans 
could still only call on 567 operational AFV.96 Had the II SS Panzer Korps remained in 
bis zur Bereitstellung und Lage bei XXXX.A.K., T354, R606, F000039; II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellungs u. Angriffsplan für 
den Angriff am 24.7.43, T354, R606, F000040; II SS Panzer Korps, Ablauf der Marschbewegungen II SS Panzer Korps, 
24–29.7.43, T354, R606, F000043; II SS Panzer Korps, Bereitstellung des II SS Panzer Korps am 29.7.3 und Verlauf des 
30.7.43, T354, R606, F000050-51; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 46 and 187–88; 
II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII. 
Pz-AK daily reports for SS-T 18–20.7.43 T314, R1171, F000388-482; Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers: German Tank 
Maintenance in World War 2 Vol 1. (Monroe: Panzerwrecks Publishing 2010) 152, 154 and 160.
93AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; II SS Panzer 
Korps, LSSAH Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; Jentz, Thomas, (ed.) Panzer Truppen II, p.136; Gen 
Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; See June/July 1943 
delivery reports for 71 LSSAH Panthers, 5 LSSAH Tigers, 4 LSSAH self-propelled guns and August delivery report for 53 
LSSAH Pz IV on Sturmpanzer website; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Heiber, 
Helmut & Glantz, David, Hitler and his Generals: Military Conferences 1942–1945, (New York: Enigma Books 2004), Midday 
Situation Report, 26.7.1943, 248–49; Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2007), 
24–25 & 61–63. The reliability of the 71 LSSAH Panthers was so poor that, without seeing combat, they were in 
October 1943 exchanged for 96 new Panthers. The original faulty LSSAH Panthers were refitted in Germany and in 
December 1943 sent to Army Group North where they were used by Panzer Regiment 29 as semi-mobile pillboxes. In 
February 1944 Panzer Regiment 29 transferred its 13 surviving Panthers to SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland, which 
operated them as conventional panzers. 2 of these ex-LSSAH Panthers even participated in the battle of Berlin in 
April 1945. Jentz, Thomas, (ed.) Panzer Truppen II (Atglen: Schiffer 1996), 257; MacDougall, Roddy and Neely, Darren, 
Nürnberg’s Panzer Factory, A Photographic Study (Monroe: Panzerwrecks Publishing 2013), 106–117; Archer, Lee, Kraska, 
Robert, and Lippert, Mario, Panzers in Berlin 1945 (Old Heathfield: Panzerwrecks Publishing 2019), 12.
94III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 9–21.8.43, T314, R201; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 
& 2, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201.
95II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, daily 
report for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 28–29.7.43, T354, R605, F000885-921.
96Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 189–90.
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the Kharkov area (the same could be said of the 3rd Panzer and Grossdeutschland 
divisions – the latter having briefly been sent to the Orel salient) between 20.7.-3.8.43 
in order to conduct AFV repairs, then it is beyond doubt that a greater number of 
operational AFV would have been available to oppose the Red Army’s offensive. The 
German repair services would have had around two weeks to conduct further AFV 
repairs in the same high quality repair facilities the II SS Panzer Korps had been using 
since the spring. The korps would have also been able to tap into the reported good stocks 
of spares which had been located in the area as part of the preparations for Operation 
Citadel. This clearly had already been occurring following the battle of Prokhorovka 
given the rapid rise in the LSSAH and DR AFV operational status between 13–18.7.43.97 
There was certainly good scope for further repairs as the II SS Panzer Korps including the 
LSSAH still had an inventory of 515 AFV (with an additional 142 Panthers for LSSAH 
and DR expected to arrive by late August).98 Even following the LSSAH withdrawal, DR 
and SS-T (after the LSSAH panzer transfers) still had a collective inventory in excess 400 
AFV, which again gives us a clear sense of how costly the Mius offensive had been for DR 
and SS-T AFV operational status, which to recap stood at just 155 AFV on 11.8.43 (See 
Table 19).99
A fully operational and complete II SS Panzer Korps in the hands of Manstein would 
have been a fearsome prospect. Had the II SS Panzer Korps been held in reserve (close to 
Kharkov) following Operational Citadel, then the korps would have been quite capable of 
launching a coordinated counter-attack with over 400 operational AFV, crucially, at 
a much earlier time. However, even if a major counter-offensive at Kharkov by an 
undiluted II SS Panzer Korps had been, against the odds, successful, the korps divisions 
Table 19. SS Sonderverbände operational AFV pre Kharkov counter-attack (12.8.43).100
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
DR Operational 11.8.43 17 26 6* 8 4* 61 20 12 93
SS-T Operational 11.8.43 9 22 7 1 39 16 7 62
Total 26 48 6 15 5 100 36 19 155
97Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 187–88; Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers: 
German Tank Maintenance in World War 2 Vol 1. (Monroe: Panzerwrecks Publishing 2010), 152, 154 and 160.
98PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an 
Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; 
II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; Full delivery reports for all 
panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. See delivery of 5 Tigers 
and 4 Sf Pak in July plus June/July 1943 delivery reports for 71 LSSAH Panthers & 71 DR Panthers.
99AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 9–21.8.43, T314, R201; III Pz Korps, 
1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201; II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen 
und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001.
100III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 9–21.8.43, T314, R201; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 
& 2, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201. *closest recorded operational number. 2.8.43 for T-34 and 13.8.43 for 
Bef.
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would soon have been worn down by constant combat with the inevitable result that AFV 
operational numbers would have plummeted.101
Even if Manstein could have initially pulled off another masterstroke at Kharkov as he 
had in February/March 1943, there is absolutely no doubt, given the Red Army’s massive 
overall superiority in men and material, that the fall of Kharkov would have only been 
delayed for a short period. The Red Army was by now capable of conducting multiple 
simultaneous offensives on the Eastern Front, as a result by the summer of 1943 one 
localised German success, however great, would have made little impact on the course of 
the war on the Eastern Front.102
By comparing the 1.8.43 6th Army Wochenmeldung AFV inventory for DR with the 
division’s inventory for 1.9.43 (that is located in the order of battle chart which 
accompanied the 1.9.43 divisional Meldung) we can see that in reality during the 
defence of Kharkov and its surrounding area DR lost: 18 Pz III or Bef (at least 13 of 
which were conventional Pz III), 12 Pz IV (Das Reich had received 10 new Pz IV in 
mid-August), 5 Pz V (as mentioned DR 71 strong Panther battalion entered combat on 
22.8.43) and 3 Pz VI. DR also lost 4 StuG and 4 Sf Pak over this period. As a result in 
total DR lost 46 AFV in the unsuccessful defence of Kharkov. Of course there is 
a possibility that a few of these losses occurred on 2.8.43, the last day of the Mius 
offensive. However, in stark contrast to the previous days fighting, that of 2.8.43 
consisted of a rapid advance to the Mius. As a result few AFV losses can be expected 
on this day (Table 20 to 24).103
Table 20. Das Reich operational AVF Kharkov August 1943.104
- Pz III Pz IV Pz V Pz VI Bef StuG Pak SF
9.8.43 ? ? ? ? 20 ?
10.8.43 9 19 5 ? 22 ?
11.8.43 17 26 8 ? 20 12
12.8.43 7 13 2 ? 23 ?
13.8.43 4 10 4 4 19 ?
14.8.43 5 15 6 4 19 9
15.8.43 ? ? ? ? ? ?
16.8.43 4 22 6 4 16 9
17.8.43 6 25 7 4 21 9
18.8.43 10 15 3 6 21 9
19.8.43 4 20 4 5 19 9
20.8.43 9 20 5 5 20 9
21.8.43 8 25 5 4 19 9
101II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, 
XXXXVIII.Pz-AK daily reports for SS-T 18–20.7.43 T314, R1171, F000388-482; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, 
Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 187–88; Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Truppen, Stabsoffizier für AOK 8, 5.10.43, T78, R619, F000836; XI 
Korps, 1a Anlagen z, KTB Band 13, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 15–21.9.43 & 28–30.9.43, T314, R493; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, 
KTB Band 1 & 2, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201.
102Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 84, 143, 99–101, 171–72.
103AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 
6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, DR, 1.9.43, 
T78, R719; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; See August delivery report 
for 10 DR Pz IV on Sturmpanzer website; II SS Panzer Korps, Verlauf des 2.8.43, T354, R606, F000059.
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It is far harder to accurately assess the AFV losses SS-T sustained in the defence of 
Kharkov. Following the 1.8.43 6th Army Wochenmeldung the next surviving complete 
panzer inventory (including panzers under long-term repair) for SS-T is contained in 
a 8th Army report from 5.10.43 (Figure 15). The report states that SS-T still had 50 Pz III; 
Table 21. Totenkopf operational AVF Kharkov August 1943.105
- Pz III Pz IV Pz V Pz VI Bef StuG Pak SF
9.8.43 14 27 ? ? 21 ?
10.8.43 14 13 ? 4 16 ?
11.8.43 9 22 7 1 16 7
12.8.43 15 22 5 8 17 ?
13.8.43 15 22 1 8 16 ?
14.8.43 11 17 1 7 ? ?
15.8.43 ? ? ? ? ? ?
16.8.43 10 15 3 7 16 6
17.8.43 6 18 2 8 16 ?
18.8.43 14 25 3 8 16 7
19.8.43 17 27 4 ? ? ?
20.8.43 15 26 5 8 ? 7
21.8.43 18 24 5 8 16 7
22.8.43 15 21 5 8 20 ?
Table 22. SS Sonderverbände AFV inventory 1.9.43.106
- Pz III Pz IV Pz V Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
DR Inventory 1.9.43 51 58 66 19 4–9 ? 28 8 ?
SS-T Inventory 1.9.43 50–61 32–67 18–22 8–9 ? 30 7 ?
Table 23. SS Sonderverbände operational AFV 1.9.43.107
- Pz III Pz IV Pz V Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
DR Operational 1.9.43 3 10 21 2 ? ? 23 7 ?
SS-T Operational 1.9.43 23 9 1 ? ? 15 4 ?
Table 24. Totenkopf operational AVF September 1943.108
- Pz III Pz IV Pz V Pz VI Bef StuG Pak SF
15.9.43 14 12 3 7 14 4
16.9.43 14 12 3 7 12 4
17.9.43 14 12 3 7 10 5
18.9.43 12 10 3 7 10 5
19.9.43 12 9 0 7 10 5
20.9.43 13 11 0 7 10 5
21.9.43 13 9 0 7 8 5
22–27.9.43 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
28.9.43 7 3 0 6 ? ?
29.9.43 5 3 0 5 1 3
30.9.43 5 3 0 6 0 ?
104III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 9–21.8.43, T314, R201.
105III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201.
106AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 
6.8.43), T312, R1483, F00044; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, DR & SS-T, 
1.9.43, T78, R719; Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Truppen, Stabsoffizier für AOK 8, 5.10.43, T78, R619, F000836; Full delivery reports for all 
panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website.
107Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, DR & SS-T, 1.9.43, T78, R719.
108XI Korps, 1a Anlagen z, KTB Band 13, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 15–21.9.43 & 28–30.9.43, T314, R493.
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however, only 26 Pz IV are recorded (3 operational, 15 short-term repair, 8 long-term 
repair). The divisional Meldung from 1.9.43 stated SS-T had 32 Pz IV operational or under 
short/medium term repair (3 weeks); the rest of the panzer types had greater values in the 
5.10.43 8th Army report. Therefore on 1.9.43 SS-T must have had in excess of 50 Pz III and 
32 Pz IV in its inventory; the divisional Meldung for this date did not include AFV under 
long-term repair. The 5.10.43 8th Army report also states that SS-T possessed 8 Bef and 23 
Tiger tanks (the division had just received 5 new Tiger tanks – these were SS-T’s first new 
AFV of any type received since July). Although the order of battle chart which accompanied 
the 1.9.43 divisional Meldung does not include a panzer inventory, it does state that SS-T 
possessed 30 StuG and 7 Sf Pak.109
Therefore the maximum number of panzer losses that SS-T could have sustained 
between 1.8.43 and 1.9.43 is: 11 Pz III, 35 Pz IV, 4 Pz VI and 1 Bef. Of course a proportion 
of these losses would have occurred in September. SS-T also suffered the loss of 4 StuG 
and 2 Sf Pak in the August fighting around Kharkov. Given that SS-T Pz IV operational 
numbers did not rise above the mid-20s throughout August 1943, it seems likely that 
many of 47 Pz IV that the 1.8.43 Wochenmeldung stated required ‘short-term repair’ in 
fact never saw combat again. These panzers would have been either abandoned during 
September’s retreat to the Dnieper or evacuated to homeland maintenance. The lasting 
detrimental impact of the Mius offensive should not be underestimated.110
Overall during Operation Rumyantsev the 5th Guard Tank Army (which had been 
reconstituted following the battle of Prokhorovka) and the 1st Tank Army once again 
suffered catastrophic losses. In twenty days the 5th Guard Tank Army’s strength fell from 
543 tanks to only 50, while 1st Tank Army and attached units lost 1,042 vehicles (the tank 
army having been continuously resupplied with new tanks during the battle). When the 
vital transport, supply and communications hub of Kharkov was finally captured by the 
Soviets on 23.8.43, it came at great cost, the Soviets having lost 1,864 tanks and assault 
guns during the offensive. With the fall of Kharkov a German withdrawal to the Dnieper 
became inevitable. The Soviet success on the entire Eastern Front in July and August 
came at a savage cost, with the Red Army losing an astonishing 9,294 tanks and assault 
guns. During the same period the Wehrmacht lost only 1,331 tanks and assault guns.111
Reappraising Prokhorovka
It is the author’s view that it is only sensible that the historiography of the battle of 
Prokhorovka, regarding German AFV losses, shifts to offering the maximum number of 
109AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 
6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Truppen, Stabsoffizier für AOK 8, 5.10.43, T78, R619, F000836; Gen Insp. 
d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, SS-T, 1.9.43, T78, R719; II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T 
Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, SS-T 
Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201; Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are 
available from the Sturmpanzer website.
110AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 
6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Truppen, Stabsoffizier für AOK 8, 5.10.43, T78, R619, F000836; Gen Insp. d 
Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, SS–T, 1.9.43, T78, R719; II SS Panzer Korps, SS–T 
Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, SS-T 
Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201; Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are 
available from the Sturmpanzer website.
111Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
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AFV losses that the Germans could have suffered on 12.7.43 (losses recorded by the 
LSSAH and DR between 11–20.7.43) (Table 25). For the first time this figure can be given 
with certainty. The maximum number of AFV losses that the Germans suffered at 
Prokhorovka was 14 AFV losses; 12 (TF) & 2 (Homeland Maintenance). Even if SS-T 
losses are taken into account, this only raises the number to 16 AFV lost.112
As has been shown in this and the author’s last article, no archival documents can be 
proved reliable enough to establish correctly, individually or collectively, which of the 
small number of AFV losses that the II SS Panzer Korps suffered between 11–20.7.43 
actually resulted from the battle of Prokhorovka on 12.7.43. There are simply too many 
AFV reclassifications and errors in the daily records taking place for this to be possible. 
We can reach the likely number of losses for 12.7.43 (particularly in the LSSAH sector) 
via combat diaries, testimonies, reconnaissance images and so forth. However, unlike the 
periods 5–10.7.43 and 21.7–1.8.43, we cannot yet ascertain the required accuracy from 
the few documents which have been proven to be accurate. As a result it is simply 
impossible to make any certain claim as to the exact number of German AFV losses that 
occurred on 12.7.43 during the battle of Prokhorovka. However, the figure is likely, 
almost certainly in fact, to be between five and ten German AFV lost.114
Table 25. Maximum number of II SS Panzer Korps AFV losses during the battle of Prokhorovka on 
12.7.43 (11–20.7.43).113
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH (11–18.7.43) 4 1 5 1 1 7
DR (11–18.7.43) 4 1 5 2 7
SS-T (11–20.7.43) 2 2
Total 8 1 1 10 3 3 16
112PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS- 
T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle 
an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; 
II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH 
Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, 
R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, 
R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, 
assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website.
113PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS- 
T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle 
an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; 
II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH 
Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, 
R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, 
R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, 
assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website.
114Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 129, 127 n, 136 n; Bundesarchiv/ 
Militärarchiv, RH 10/64, General Inspector of Panzer Troops – AGS, 5–10.7.43 Totalverluste, see also: 5–13.7.43, 
5–14.7.43, 5–15.7.43, 5–16.7.43 and 5–17.7.43 editions; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf. 
Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, 
R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 
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Although the II SS Panzer Korps recorded no losses at all on 12.7.43, this was clearly 
an incorrect early assessment. The General Inspector’s for the Panzer Troops 
5–17.7.43 AFV loss report (daily from 10.7.43 onwards) for Army Group South has 
proved to be inaccurate in attributing AFV losses to specific dates. The II SS Panzer 
Korps engineer’s 5–18.7.43 AFV loss report is accurate in terms of the number of AFV 
it lists as lost by LSSAH and DR (even though reclassifications within these numbers 
still occurred). When the II SS Panzer Korps engineer’s report is matched with the 
reliable 5–10.7.43 total loss reports for LSSAH, DR and even SS-T, this allows us to 
gauge accurately the maximum number of LSSAH and DR AFV losses that occurred 
between 11–18.7.43.115
However, there is simply no way to determine precisely what proportion of the 
11–18.7.43 LSSAH and DR losses occurred as a result of the fighting on 12.7.43. There 
remains the possibility that some of these losses occurred on 13.7.43 during the last 
LSSAH push to reach Prokhorovka or indeed on other less active dates. Without reliable 
location determining TF reports that cover the period 11–20.7.43, complete accuracy will 
always elude us. It is not even possible to state with total confidence that the LSSAH Pz IV 
that is visible slightly beyond the crest of Hill 252.2 in German photo reconnaissance 
images from 16.7.43 and 7.8.43 was actually lost on 12.7.43. Alongside photo reconnais-
sance, we are forced to rely on battle reports and German testimony, neither of which can 
be regarded as completely watertight sources. Nevertheless, it should be stated that the 
body of evidence means that is almost certain that on 12.7.43 itself the Germans lost 3 Pz 
IV (TF) and 1 Pz IV (homeland maintenance) close to Hill 252.2. Despite this the author 
wanted to make the reader aware of the issue.116
The maximum number of AFV losses that the Germans could have suffered during the 
battle of Prokhorovka are distributed as follows: for the LSSAH 3 Pz IV TF and 1 Pz IV 
homeland maintenance, 1 Pz VI TF (for this to have occurred the ‘5–10.7.43 homeland 
maintenance Pz VI’ would have remained in the LSSAH inventory {similar cases are 
known to have occurred}, we know this Pz VI was never considered to be a total loss, see 
Figure 16. The LSSAH ‘Prokhorovka Pz VI TF’ would have been located in SS-T’s sector 
where errors in the II SS Panzer Korps engineer’s reporting are known to have occurred), 
1 StuG TF, and 1 Sf Pak homeland maintenance.
For Das Reich the maximum number of AFV losses at Prokhorovka was: 1 T-34 TF, 4 
Pz IV TF and 2 StuG TF. The majority of DR losses between 11–18.7.43 may well have 
occurred during the division’s short drive to the east to link up with III Panzer Korps that 
12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 
5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, 
Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz 
Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an 
Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, 
R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz 
Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. 
Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391;.II SS Panzer Korps, Map of korps actions, new and proposed front lines 
14–18.7.43, T354, R606, F000035; Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled gun types are 
available from the Sturmpanzer website; Ben Wheatley, “A Visual Examination of the Battle of Prokhorovka,” Journal of 
Intelligence History, Vol.18, No.2 (2019), 115–63; Ben Wheatley, “Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured longevity on 
the Eastern Front 1943–1944,” Journal of Intelligence History, published online 2020, 24–32.
115Ibid.
116Ibid.
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began on 14.7.43. DR Pz IV losses were fed into the General Inspector for Panzer Troops 
report on 15.7.43. This would seemingly tie in with the notion that DR losses occurred as 
a result of its drive east. However, we know that the DR confirmed pre-11.7.43 Pz VI loss 
was only fed into the General Inspector for Panzer Troops daily records on the 15.7.43 
(its loss location was in reality shown in the 5–10.7.43 total loss report). Naturally this 
indicates that some of the Pz IV DR losses reported by the General Inspector for Panzer 
Troops may have also occurred on an earlier date than the 15.7.43, perhaps even on the 
12.7.43. The General Inspector of the Panzer Troops (like the II SS Panzer Korps 
engineer) did not list DR T-34 losses. However, we know from the DR total loss report 
that 2 T-34 were lost between 5–10.7.43, meaning the 1 further T-34 loss that the 1.8.43 
Wochenmeldung highlights occurred during the latter part of Operation Citadel, and 
indeed may have been lost at Prokhorovka.
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It is sometimes mentioned that SS-T’s assault gun battalion fought south of the 
river and thus was involved in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, SS-T lost no 
panzers or StuG between 11–20.7.43. So this doesn’t affect the final number of 
German AFV losses that occurred during the battle of Prokhorovka. However, SS- 
T did lose 2 Sf Pak between 11.7–2.8.43 which leaves open the possibility that 
these AFV may have been lost on 12.7.43 at Prokhorovka.117
On 12.7.43 at Prokhorovka according to Valeriy Zamulin’s latest research the Soviets lost 
192 tanks and assault guns as total write-offs rising to 235 AFV by 17.7.43, chiefly as a result 
of the German post-battle destruction of abandoned Soviet tanks. The 235 tally matches 
Frieser’s assessment. However, even though the II SS Panzer Korps inflicted serious losses 
on the Red Army during the battle of Prokhorovka the Soviets could still justifiably lay claim 
to have emerged victorious, as the Red Army had achieved one of its main aims of halting 
the II SS Panzer Korps advance on Prokhorovka. By 12.7.43 the Soviets had erected an 
almost impenetrable anti-tank screen on the high ground around Prokhorovka. This ruled 
out any renewed German push to take the town. While the Red Army’s strongest weapon, 
its artillery, had yet to be fully deployed at Prokhorovka. Furthermore, despite its horren-
dous losses on 12.7.43 the 5th Guards Tank Army by 17.7.43 was still capable of fielding 444 
operational AFV (including 5th Guards Mechanized Corps) for the defence of Prokhorovka, 
while a further 211 AFV were under repair or in transit to the front. As a result the Germans 
were forced to shift their intended axis of advance to the north-west away from 
Prokhorovka, towards Oboyan (Operation Roland).118
Conclusion
As a result of the discovery of the 6th Army’s Wochenmeldung über Panzer und 
Sturmgeschülzlage Stand for 1.8.43 we are in a position to adjust the total number of AFV 
losses that the II SS Panzer Korps sustained during Operation Citadel and its immediate 
aftermath (5–20.7.43) (Table 26). The final number of German AFV lost during the operation 
is extremely low at just 41 AFV (42 if we include 1 LSSAH Pz I Bef). This means that of the 
original 547 AFV (not including Pz I or Pz II) which embarked on the offensive on 5.7.43 
with the II SS Panzer Korps, 506 AFV (92.5%) were still in the II SS Panzer Korps divisional 
inventories on 20.7.43 (4 new Sf Pak were received after the 10.7.43).119
In the early hours of 11.7.43 the II SS Panzer Korps possessed 521–522 AFV in its 
inventory (95.4% of its pre-Operation Citadel inventory). Therefore the II SS Panzer 
117Ibid.
118Zamulin, Valeriy. “Soviet Troop Losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka,” 10–16 July 1943, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 
32:1 (2019), 118–21; Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, 
Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 136 n, 138–45.
119PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS- 
T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle 
an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; 
II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH 
Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, 
R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, 
R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, 
assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website.
44 B. WHEATLEY
Korps lost just 15–16 AFV between 11–20.7.43 (521/522–15/16 =506), which of course 
included the battle of Prokhorovka on 12.7.43. As the II SS Panzer Korps began the battle 
of Prokhorovka with no more than 522 AFV in its inventory and concluded the battle 
with no less than 506 of these AFV, then at least 96.9% of II SS Panzer Korps AFV 
survived the battle, or to put it another way the II SS Panzer Korps lost no more than 
3.1% of its pre-battle (11.7.43) AFV inventory on 12.7.43 (Table 27).121 At this point we 
need to remind ourselves that for many years post-war Soviet and Western historiogra-
phy claimed that the II SS Panzer Korps lost 300 AFV during the battle of Prokhorovka 
(57.5% of its pre-battle inventory), while the commander of 5th Guards Tank Army 
General Rotmistrov declared that the II SS Panzer Korps lost 400 AFV during the battle 
(76.6% of its pre-battle inventory).122
Table 26. II SS Panzer Korps AFV losses during operation Citadel & its aftermath 5–20.7.43.120
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
LSSAH (5–18.7.43) 1 9 1 1* 12 3 3 18
DR (5–18.7.43) 2 6 3 1 0 12 2 0 14
SS-T (5–20.7.43) 2 4 1 0 7 1 2 10
Total 5 19 3 3 1 31 6 5 42
Table 27. II SS Panzer Korps AFV inventory July-mid August 1943.123
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
4.7.43 Total 138 168 24 42 27 399 104 44 547
01:00 11.7.43 Total 133 157 22 39–40* 27 378–379 101 42 521–522
01:00 21.7.43 Total 133 149 21 39 27 369 98 43–45 510–512
26.7.43 Total 133 149 21 44 27 374 98 43–45 515–517
29.7.43 Total 129# 144 21 44 18 356 66 21–23 443–445
01:00 2.8.43 Total 119~ 127 21 44 20~ 331 66 21 418
9.8.43 Estimated Total (III Pz Korps) ? ? ? 42 ? ca.325 66 21 ca.412
120PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS- 
T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle 
an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS 
Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, 
F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 
(written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; 
II SS Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH 
Ia, Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, 
R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, 
R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, 
assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. *Pz I Bef.
121Ibid.
122Frieser, Karl-Heinz, “The Battle of the Kursk Salient” in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 
Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 120–21, 128–34.
123PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 
Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an 
Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, (LSSAH written 12.7.43, DR & SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43) T313, R390; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; 
AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), 
T312, R1483, F000441; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; II SS Panzer Korps, 
SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, Tagesmeldung für 
den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; Gen 
Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, 
LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled 
gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website. *This depends which LSSAH Tiger was actually written off. #Not 
including 3 Ex-LSSAH Pz III with II SS Panzer Korps HQ. ~2 Pz III lg listed under Bef.
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Clearly during Operation Citadel the period 5–10.7.43 was more damaging for the II 
SS Panzer Korps in terms of AFV losses than the period 11–20.7.43. What is perhaps even 
more remarkable is that on the evening of 18.7.43 350 of the II SS Panzer Korps AFV 
were operational, an increase of 11 AFV from 11.7.43 (the day prior to the battle of 
Prokhorovka). This was however 138 AFV less than the 488 AFV which were operational 
on 4.7.43, the day prior to the launch of Operation Citadel (Table 28).124
What the historiography of Operation Citadel always lacked, even after the true course 
of events became more widely known, was a single stand-alone post-Prokhorovka and 
post-Operation Citadel II SS Panzer Korps AFV inventory which could simply be com-
pared with the well known pre-Operation Citadel II SS Panzer Korps AFV inventory. This 
therefore is what makes the 6th Army’s Wochenmeldung über Panzer und 
Sturmgeschülzlage Stand for 1.8.43 such a remarkable and historically important docu-
ment. Even if the Wochenmeldung is read in isolation, the document proves that on 20.7.43 
(just four days after the conclusion of Operation Citadel) the II SS Panzer Korps possessed 
at least 351 (88%) of its original 399 pre-Operation Citadel complement of panzers (none 
of these figure includes Pz I and Pz II). According to the Wochenmeldung on 20.7.43 the 
panzers were distributed between the three SS divisions in the following way: LSSAH 89 
(shown as transfers to DR and SS-T – not including the 5 new Pz VI received on 25.7.43), 
DR 130 and SS-T 132.126 Of course, we also know that after Operation Citadel the LSSAH 
passed on 3 Pz III to the II SS Panzer Korps HQ and retained 1 Pz III, 5 Pz IV & 9 Bef 
(again not including Pz I and Pz II) which adds a further 18 Panzers to the actual number 
of Operation Citadel survivors. Therefore, in reality the total number of surviving panzers 
stood at 369 (92.5%).127 The importance of the 6th Army Wochenmeldung therefore 
Table 28. II SS Panzer Korps operational AFV July-mid August 1943.125
- Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
4.7.43 Operational Total 117 156 18 35 25 351 95 42 488
01:00 11.7.43 Operational Total 98 87 8 16 18 227 73 39 339
23:00 18.7.43 Operational Total 73 108 17 25 22 245 76 29 350
28.7.43 (including LSSAH 24.7.43) Operational 
Total
92 104 2 21 14 233 84 39 356
01:00 2.8.43 Operational Total 63 24 6 2 14 109 34 16 159
23:00 11.8.43 Operational Total (III Pz Korps) 26 48 6 15 5 100 36 19 155
124II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, 
XXXXVIII.Pz-AK daily reports for SS-T 18–20.7.43 T314, R1171, F000388-482; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, 
Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 187–88.
125Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 187–88; II SS Panzer 
Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, Daily 
reports for SS-T 18–20.7.43, T314, R1171, F000388-482; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 
9–21.8.43, T314, R201; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201.
126PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS- 
T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung 
über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441.
127AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 
6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 
(written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH, Rgt.Bef.Std., 27.7.43, T354, R607, F000825; II SS 
Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, 
Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; Images of the tanks retained by the LSSAH can be found on 
the following website: https://www.thirdreichmedals.com/article/WSS.html; Jentz, Thomas, (ed.) Panzer Truppen II, 
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cannot be underestimated as by itself the document tells us that in actual fact at least 88% 
of the II SS Panzer Korps’ pre-Operation Citadel complement of panzers survived the 
operation and by default also the battle of Prokhorovka.128
As we have seen, Operation Citadel was far from a disaster for the II SS Panzer Korps. 
Thanks to good stocks of spare parts (built up for Operation Citadel), in July 1943 a high 
number of damaged panzers were quickly brought back to operational readiness. By 
18.7.43 (the scheduled start date of the abortive Operation Roland) 350 AFV were 
operational. To place this figure into context the III Panzer Korps (6th, 7th, 19th Panzer 
Divisions, 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion and 228th Assault Gun Battalion) began Operation 
Citadel with 377 AFV in its entire inventory. However, Hitler’s frankly suicidal decision 
to send the II SS Panzer Korps south to the Mius and Italy (influenced by economic and 
political considerations) greatly hampered any further increase in AFV operational 
numbers. As a result on 12.8.43 when the when DR & SS-T did finally launch 
a watered down counter-attack west of Kharkov, they did so with just 155 operational 
AFV, instead of a powerful coordinated counter-offensive by the entire II SS Panzer 
Korps with an entirely feasible operational strength of over 400 AFV. Nevertheless, such 
a counter-offensive would have undoubtedly been the swan song of the II SS Panzer 
Korps (in its original form) on the Eastern Front. Even if a counter-offensive had been 
successful by late August with stocks of AFV spare parts exhausted and the time required 
to conduct major repairs having evaporated, the II SS Panzer Korps operational AFV 
strength would have been rapidly eroded. In addition, further major Soviet offensives on 
its flanks would have ultimately forced the II SS Panzer Korps away from Kharkov.129
In reality during three weeks of defensive combat around Kharkov, DR suffered 
a further 46 AFV losses on top of the 10 AFV losses sustained in 3–4 days combat on 
the Mius Front. If we add to this total the 14 AFV DR lost during Operation Citadel we 
can see that during the two month long battle of Kursk (and Mius offensive) DR lost in 
total 70 AFV. Most damaging however, was the number of non-operational AFV that DR 
had accumulated in July. Nevertheless, it was not damage to AFV sustained during 
Operation Citadel that hindered subsequent operations around Kharkov. These had 
largely been made good by 18.7.43 (as they had with the LSSAH), rather it was the 
lengthy transports and the four day Mius operation at the end of the month that had 
a lasting effect on AFV availability.130
p.136; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; See 
June/July 1943 delivery reports for 5 LSSAH Tigers, 4 LSSAH self-propelled guns and August delivery report for 53 LSSAH 
Pz IV on Sturmpanzer website; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391.
128PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS- 
T, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 1–2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung 
über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441.
129II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, DR and SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, 
XXXXVIII.Pz-AK daily reports for SS-T 18–20.7.43 T314, R1171, F000388-482; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, 
Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 30–31, 46, 187–88; Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers: German Tank Maintenance in 
World War 2 Vol 1., 152, 154 and 160; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 9–21.8.43, T314, R201; 
III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201; XI Korps, 1a Anlagen z, KTB Band 
13, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 15–21.9.43 & 28–30.9.43, T314, R493; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional 
Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, 1.9.43, T78, R719; Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Truppen, Stabsoffizier für AOK 8, 5.10.43, 
T78, R619, F000836; Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers: German Tank Maintenance in World War 2, Vol 2., 156.
130AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 
6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, DR, 1.9.43, 
T78, R719; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 11.8.43, T314, R201; See August delivery report 
for 10 DR Pz IV on Sturmpanzer website; II SS Panzer Korps, Verlauf des 2.8.43, T354, R606, F000059; II SS Panzer Korps, 
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Although we are unable to establish the exact number of AFV losses SS-T sustained 
during the German defence of Kharkov, similar AFV losses to DR can be expected, given 
that both divisions re-entered combat around the same time. Prior to its commitment to 
the Mius counter-attack, SS-T had followed a slightly different path to DR, as the division 
had remained in combat north of Belgorod longer and undertook a more direct (if delayed) 
transport to 6th Army. This had the affect of slowing the recovery of SS-T’s AFV numbers 
following Operation Citadel. SS-T’s operational AFV numbers only recovered in time for 
the launch of the Mius offensive; however, when the offensive began SS-T operational 
numbers rapidly fell away as a result of the division’s difficulties in taking Hill 213.9.131
Following Operation Citadel, Hitler’s misuse of the LSSAH, the Donets/Mius dalliance 
and its associated transports left the remaining SS Sonderverbände of DR and SS-T ill 
prepared to conduct a counter-attack at Kharkov on 12.8.43. This would have far reach-
ing consequences for the German defence of the city and the Wehrmacht’s ability to fight 
east of the Dnieper.
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Appendix A. LSSAH AVF Strength during July 1943
Appendix B. Das Reich AVF Strength during July 1943









Inventory 4.7.43 13 83 13 9 118 35 21 174
In inventory the day prior to the battle of 
Prokhorovka (01:00 11.7.43)
12 78 12–13* 9 111–112 33 19 163–164
Inventory 01:00 19.7.43 (following Citadel) 12 74 12 9 107 32 22# 161
Inventory 25.7.43 12 74 17~ 9 112 32 22 166
Inventory 29.7.43 (following transfer to DR & SS-T) 1 5 9 15 32 22 69
Operational 4.7.43 11 79 12 9 111 34 20 165
Operational 01:00 11.7.43 5 41 4 6 56 23 17 96
Operational 18.7.43 7 55 9 8 79 28 16 123
Operational 24.7.43 7 55 10 6 78 30 22 130
Appendix B. 133 Das Reich AVF Strength during July 1943
Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
Inventory 4.7.43 62 33 24 14 9 142 34 12 188
Inventory the day prior to the battle of  
Prokhorovka (01:00 11.7.43)
60 31 22 13 9 135 34 12 181
Inventory 01:00 21.7.43 (following Citadel) 60 27 21 13 9 130 32 12 174
Inventory 29.7.43 (following LSSAH transfer) 64 66 21 22 9 182 32 12 226
Inventory 01:00 2.8.43 58* 60 21 22 11* 172 32 12 216
Operational 4.7.43 47 30 18 12 8 115 33 11 159
Operational 01:00 11.7.43 40 16 8 1 5 70 29 11 110
Operational 18.7.43 36 24 17 9 7 93 28 10 131
Operational 22.7.43 36 24 17 9 7 93 28 10 131
Operational 27.7.43 46 20 1 3 2 72 28# 11 111
Operational 28.7.43 (not including LSSAH Pz) 33 17 2 6 3 61 28 11~ 100
Operational 01:00 2.8.43 23 15 6 1 8 53 16 10 79
132PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1–2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. 
Bestandsmeldung. 1.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. 
Kfz. 1–10.7.43, written 12.7.43, T313, R390; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, 
updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung 
über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, LSSAH Ia, 
Tagesmeldung für den 24.7.43, T354, R605, F000867; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, 
R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, 
R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391; Full delivery reports for all panzer, 
assault gun and self-propelled gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, 
Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 187–88; II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for LSSAH, 
18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807-982. *This depends on which LSSAH Tiger was actually written off. #Includes 4 new 
Pak Sf. ~ Includes 5 new Tigers.
133PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 1.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR, Gep. Kfz. Bestandsmeldung. 
1.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, DR and SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 1–10.7.43, DR 
& SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43, T313, R390; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 5–18.7.43, 
updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, Wochenmeldung 
über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 
667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled 
gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical 
Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 187–88; II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for DR, 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807- 
982; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage z, KTB Band 1 & 2, DR Tagesmeldung, 9–21.8.43, T314, R201. *2 Pz III lg listed under Bef. 
#following day. ~previous day.
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Appendix C. Totenkopf AVF Strength during July 1943
Appendix D. II SS Panzer Korps HQ AFV Strength during July 1943
Appendix C. 134 Totenkopf AVF Strength during July 1943
Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
Inventory 4.7.43 63 52 15 9 139 35 11 185
In inventory the day prior to the battle of  
Prokhorovka (01:00 11.7.43)
61 48 14 9 132 34 11 177
Inventory at 01:00 21.7.43 (following Citadel) 61 48 14 9 132 34 9–11* 175–177
Inventory 29.7.43 (following LSSAH transfer) 65 78 22 9 174 34 9–11* 217–219
Inventory 2.8.43 at 01:00 61 67 22~ 9 159 34 9 202
Operational 4.7.43 59 47 11 8 125 28 11 164
Operational 01:00 11.7.43 53 30 11 7 101 21 11 133
Operational 18.7.43 30 29 7 7 73 20 3 96
Operational 16:45 20.7.43 39 26 5 6 76 ? ? ?
Operational 28.7.43 (not including LSSAH Pz) 52 32 5 5 94 26 6# 126#
Operational 01:00 2.8.43 40 9 1 6 56 18 6 80
Appendix D. 135 II SS Panzer Korps HQ AFV Strength during July 1943
Pz III Pz IV T-34 Pz VI Bef Total Pz StuG Pak Sf Total AFV
Inventory 29.7.43 (following LSSAH transfer) 3 3 3
134PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, SS-T, Fahrgestell-Nr. Pz.kpf.Wg. 2.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, DR & SS-T, Gep. Kfz. 
Bestandsmeldung. 2.7.43 & 10.7.43, T313, R390; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, SS-T, Betr.: Totalausfälle an Pz.Kpfwg. und gep. Kfz. 
1–10.7.43, SS-T Lageskizzen written 23.7.43, T313, R390; II SS Panzer Korps, Ingenieur, Betr.: Kinsatz Raum Belgorod. 
5–18.7.43, updated to 22.7.43 (written 28.7.43), T354, R607, F000629-31; AOK 6, 1a, KTB 9, Zustandsberichte, 
Wochenmeldung über Panzer und Sturmgeschülzlage Stand 1.8.43 (written 6.8.43), T312, R1483, F000441; II SS 
Panzer Korps, SS-T Fehlbestäde an Waffen und Grossgerät, 3.8.43, T354, R605, F001001; II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T 
Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; Full delivery reports for all panzer, assault gun and self-propelled 
gun types are available from the Sturmpanzer website; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical 
Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 187–88; II SS Panzer Korps, Daily reports for SS-T 18.7–2.8.43, T354, R605, F000807- 
982; XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, XXXXVIII.Pz-AK, Daily reports for SS-T 18–20.7.43, T314, R1171, F000388-482; III Pz Korps, 1a Anlage 
z, KTB Band 1 & 2, SS-T Tagesmeldung, 9–22.8.43, T314, R201. *2 Pak SF lost sometime between 11.7.43 and end of Mius 
operation. #Unlikely to be less than 6 as this number of SS-T Pak Sf was operational on 31.7.43. ~At some point after 
2.8.43 two damaged pre-Citadel era SS-T Tigers 250 103 and 250 230 were sent to homeland maintenance and then 
converted into Sturmmörser 38 cm ‘Tiger’. In October 1944 250 103 was serving with Sturmmörser Kompanie 1001, 
while in December 1944 250 230 was serving with Sturmmörser Kompanie 1000. Delivery dates can be found at 
sturmpanzer.com .
135II SS Panzer Korps, DR & SS-T Ia 667/43 & 668/43, 28.7.43, T354, R605, F000879-80; Gen Insp. d Pz Truppen, Waffen SS 
monthly divisional Meldung and OB charts, LSSAH, 1.9.43, T78, R719; PzAOK 4, O.Qu.V, LSSAH, Gep. Kfz. 
Bestandsmeldung . 1.11.43, T313, R391.
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